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WHO CARES HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS?

Ryan D. Doerfler*
Legislative intent is a fiction. Courts and scholars accept this by and large. As this
Article shows, however, both are confused as to why, and, more importantly, as to
what this entails.
This Article argues that the standard account of why legislative intent is a fiction—
that Congress is a “they,” not an “it”—rests on an overly simplistic conception of
shared agency. Drawing on contemporary work in philosophy of action, this Article
contends that Congress as such has no intentions not because of difficulties in
aggregating the intentions of individual members, but rather because Congress lacks
the sort of delegatory structure that one finds in, for example, a corporation. This
reformulated argument for intent skepticism reveals that recent attempts to
rehabilitate actual, historical intent—all of which rest upon a delegatory model—are
misguided.
Second and more importantly, this Article argues that the fictional nature of
legislative intent entails that, contrary to a recent, influential wave of scholarship,
interpreters of legislation have little reason to care about the fine details of legislative
process. It is platitude that legislative text must be interpreted “in context.” As this
Article explains, however, “context” consists of information salient to author and
audience alike. This basic insight from philosophy of language necessitates what this
Article calls the conversation model of interpretation, whereby legislation is treated as
having been written by legislators for those tasked with administering the law (e.g.,
courts, agencies) and, critically, those on whom the law operates (e.g., citizens). An
interpreter thus occupies the position of conversational participant, hearing statements
directed at her and other participants. So situated, that interpreter reads legislative
text in a “context” consisting of information salient both to members of Congress
and to, for example, citizens.
The conversation model displaces what this Article calls the eavesdropping model of
interpretation, the prevailing paradigm among both courts and scholars. When
asking what sources of information an interpreter should consider, courts and
scholars—both textualists and purposivists—reliably privilege the epistemic position
of members of Congress. The result is that legislation is treated erroneously as
having been written by legislators for legislators. An interpreter is thus relegated to
eavesdropper, left to listen in on the conversation. So situated, that interpreter reads
legislative text in a “context” consisting of information salient to members of
Congress in particular. This tendency is plainest in recent scholarship urging greater
attention to legislative process—the nuances of which are of high salience to
legislators, but plainly not so to citizens. As this Article explains, attending to “how
Congress really works” could make sense if Congress had unexpressed intentions to
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Hrafn
Asgeirsson, William Baude, Mitchell Berman, Adam Chilton, Richard Fallon, Abbe Gluck, Alon
Harel, Aziz Huq, Genevieve Lakier, Brian Leiter, Jonathan Masur, Jennifer Nou, Martha
Nussbaum, John Rappaport, Fred Schauer, Louis Michael Seidman, David Strauss, and the
participants in the Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop for helpful comments and suggestions.
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discover. Because legislative intent is a fiction, however, Congress has no such
hidden intentions to find.
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INTRODUCTION
Claims about legislative intent are pervasive and, contrary to much
scholarly opinion,1 unavoidable. The reason is that statutory interpretation, like
ordinary conversation, is rife with what linguists and philosophers call pragmatic
inference, i.e. inference based upon the practical circumstance. In both
mundane contexts and in the law, attribution of practical intentions is
indispensable to understanding what people mean. The War Powers Resolution
(“WPR”), for example, states that the President shall “terminate any use of
United States Armed Forces” within sixty days “unless,” among other things,
“the Congress … has declared war.”2 Setting aside constitutional concerns,3 all
agree that the WPR requires the President to terminate hostilities within sixty
days unless Congress has declared war since those hostilities were initiated. That
Congress has declared war at some point4 is, by contrast, irrelevant. Interpreters
rightly treat this as obvious. But how do they know? As this Article explains,
interpreters know what Congress is trying to say only because they know also
what Congress is trying to do (here, limit the President’s authority to engage in
hostilities without congressional approval).
Although necessary, claims about legislative intent are also literally false.
This is because, as an empirical matter, members of Congress do not share
intentions.5 That Congress is a “they,” not an “it,” is a common refrain.6 But,
as this Article explains, familiar public-choice theoretic arguments against
legislative intent of the sort voiced by Kenneth Shepsle rest on a doubtful
See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the
Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 76 (2012) (“[N]o one need look for the fictional intent of Congress in
searching for the meaning of its decisions. The term ‘legislative intent’ is obscuring, even for
those of us who consider ourselves ‘originalists’ in matters of statutory interpretation. Intent is
simply a constitutional heuristic used to remind judges that, in the end, it is not their decision,
but Congress’s.”); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 793 (1999) (“The notions of congressional understanding and legislative
intent are merely metaphors, of course, and somewhat misleading anthropomorphizing
metaphors at that ….”).
2 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
3 See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 10812 (1984) (surveying arguments for and against).
4 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 116, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795 (1941) (declaring war on Japan in the
wake of Pearl Harbor).
5 See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF ACTING
TOGETHER (2014) [hereinafter BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY]; MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT
COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD (2013) [hereinafter GILBERT, JOINT
COMMITMENT]; John Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION
(Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan, & Martha E. Pollack eds., 1990).
6 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is A “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent As Oxymoron, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
1
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premise, namely that sharing intentions is about aggregation of attitudes. As
this Article shows, the ability to aggregate lots of individual intentions is neither
necessary nor sufficient to the formation of shared intentions. One can, for
example, attribute to a corporation its general counsel’s intention to settle a
lawsuit even if other members of the corporation are unaware of the suit. As
this Article goes on to argue, however, the much en vogue analogy between
corporations and Congress also fails.7 To use the previous example, one can
make sense of that attribution of an intention to settle only because members of
a corporation share an intention to delegate to the corporation’s general counsel
control over legal strategy. Members of Congress, by contrast, share no
corresponding intention to treat as authoritative the views of, say, a statute’s
“principal sponsors” or “others who worked to secure enactment.”8 Add to this
the lack of a mechanism for reconciling the intentions of, for instance,
committee drafters and drafters of later amendments, and it becomes clear that,
even on a more sophisticated understanding of shared agency, Congress has few
if any intentions qua “it.”
This Article argues that, to resolve the above tension—that Congress
must have intentions for legislation to be meaningful, yet Congress has no
“collective” intentions—one should embrace what philosophers call fictionalism
about legislative intent.9 Fictionalism about some domain of human discourse
is the thesis that claims within that domain are best understood not as aiming at
literal truth but rather as involving a useful fiction. When children play cops
and robbers, for example, utterances such as “Mary has a gun!” or “The money
is in the vault!” involve an obvious pretense. In analytic philosophy, fictionalism
is a well-established approach to making sense of a discourse that appears to
refer to things that do not exist.10 As this Article explains, utterances within a
fictionalist discourse are still apt or inapt. It is just that aptness is determined by
pretense in combination with facts on the ground. Whether Mary “has a gun,”
for instance, could hinge on whether Mary possesses a twig.
See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 1, at 82 (“Just as corporations are bound by the statements of their
agents, Congress may be bound by the statements of its agents.”); JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN
AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 280
(2009) (“We find no problem attributing intentions to corporations, groups, and institutions in
ordinary life ….”).
8 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 48 (2014).
9 See generally Matti Eklund, Fictionalism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/fictionalism/.
10 See, e.g., Gideon Rosen & Cian Dorr, Composition as Fiction, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
METAPHYSICS (Richard M. Gale ed., 2002) (arguing for fictionalism about ordinary objects);
RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY (2001) (arguing for fictionalism about morality);
HARTRY H. FIELD, SCIENCE WITHOUT NUMBERS: A DEFENSE OF NOMINALISM (arguing for
fictionalism about numbers).
7
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This Article defends fictionalism about legislative intent as to claims
about the United States Congress. As this Article explains, intent claims about
Congress are false if taken literally because federal statutes have no unitary
author. For that reason, the fiction this Article hypothesizes is that such statutes
have some author or other. Understood as involving this fiction, a claim about
legislative intent is apt if and only if one would make that claim about a generic author
just on the basis of her having written the statute at issue in the context of enactment. So
conceived, fictionalism about legislative intent amounts to a philosophical
refinement of what textualists sometimes refer to as “objectified” legislative
intent.11 Fictionalism improves upon prior accounts of objectified intent in that
it both offers a more rigorous theoretical justification for attributing such
intent—in particular, by explaining why intent attributions are necessary as
opposed to merely useful— and provides a more precise account of the truth (or
aptness) conditions of such attributions.
To say that intent is a fiction is thus not to say that anything goes, that
one can attribute any ‘intention’ one wants to a piece of legislation. It is a
platitude that a legislative text must be interpreted in “context.”12 As this Article
explains, however, “context” consists of information salient to author and
audience alike.13 “[P]articipants in [a] conversation” depend upon cognitive
“common ground” to make known their communicative intentions.14 When,
for example, Karen says to Amy, “I will see you at the beach,” that attempt at
communication will succeed only if there is some beach that is salient to both.
E.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005)
[hereinafter Manning, Legislative Intent] (“[T]extualists focus on ‘objectified intent’—the import
that a reasonable person conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would
attach to the enacted words.”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts] (explaining that textualists appeal to “a sort of
‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law,
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”).
12 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392 (2003)
[hereinafter Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine] (“[I]t is now well settled that textual interpretation
must account for the text in its social and linguistic context.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) (“The philosophy of language, and most particularly
the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has established that sets of words do not possess intrinsic
meanings and cannot be given them ….”).
13 See, e.g., Kent Bach, Content ex Machina, in SEMANTICS VERSUS PRAGMATICS 15, 19 (Zoltán
Gendler Szabó ed., 2005) [hereinafter Bach, Content ex Machina] (“Communicative success
requires uttering a sentence which, given the mutually salient information that comprises the
extralinguistic cognitive context of utterance, makes the speaker’s communicative intention
evident and enables his audience to recognize it.” (emphasis added)).
14 Robert C. Stalnaker, Common Ground, 25 LING. & PHIL. 701, 701 (2002).
11
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More generally, successful communication depends upon agreement among
conversational participants as to what “matters.”15 For this reason, a speaker
takes it for granted that what she says will be interpreted against the backdrop
of information that is salient both to her and to those to whom she speaks.16
The importance of the above insight to statutory interpretation is subtle
but hard to overstate. It necessitates what this Article calls the conversation model
of interpretation, which is crucial to understanding the nature of legislative
intent. On this model, legislation is treated as having been written by Congress
for those tasked with administering the law (e.g., courts, agencies) and for those
on whom the law operates (e.g., citizens). An interpreter thus occupies the
position of conversational participant, hearing statements directed at her and the
other participants. So situated, an interpreter reads legislative text in a context
consisting of information salient both to members of Congress and to, for
example, citizens. As this Article explains, adherence to the conversation model
does not by itself dictate what sources of information an interpreter should
consider when making sense of a statute. What it does is limit the range of
plausible answers to that question. If, in addition to text, one thinks that courts
should consider, say, legislative history, one is hard-pressed to explain why they
should not also consider public statements by officials or reports by popular
media outlets. Such visible portrayals of legislation are, after all, of much higher
salience to most Americans than House Report 114-706.
The conversation model displaces what this Article calls the eavesdropping
model of interpretation, which has been the prevailing paradigm among both
courts and scholars. When asking what information an interpreter should
consider, both courts and scholars reliably privilege the epistemic position of
members of Congress. The result is that legislation is treated erroneously as
having been written by legislators for legislators. An interpreter is thus relegated
to eavesdropper, listening in on the conversation. So situated, an interpreter
reads legislative text in a context consisting of information salient to members
of Congress in particular. This Article argues that privileging the epistemic
Stefano Predelli, Painted Leaves, Context, and Semantic Analysis, 28 LING. & PHIL. 351, 365 (2005);
see also Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 597, 598 (2013) [hereinafter Soames, Deferentialism] (observing that “[i]n most standard
linguistic communications, all parties know, and know they all know, … the general purpose of
the communication”).
16 Robert Stalnaker, Indicative Conditionals, in CONTEXT AND CONTENT: ESSAYS ON
INTENTIONALITY IN SPEECH AND THOUGHT 63, 67 (1999) [hereinafter Stalnaker, Indicative
Conditionals] (“A speaker inevitably takes certain information for granted when he speaks as the
common ground of the participants in the conversation. It is this information which he can use
as a resource for the communication of further information, and against which he will expect
his speech acts to be understood.”).
15
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position of members could make sense if Congress had unexpressed intentions
to discover—much in the way that it could make sense to consult an historical
individual’s private papers when making sense of an unclear public statement.
Because, however, legislative intent is a fiction, Congress has no concealed
intentions to find. There is, in turn, no corresponding reason to rifle through
members’ personal effects.
This Article shows that both textualists and purposivists adhere to the
eavesdropping model much if not all of the time. The longstanding debate over
whether to consider legislative history,17 for example, reflects an impulse to
eavesdrop on both sides.18 Adherence to the eavesdropping model is plainest,
however, in recent, influential scholarship urging greater attention to “how
Congress really works.”19 This scholarship asks interpreters, through attention
to process, to sort legislative history “wheat” from “chaff.”20 Judge Robert
Katzmann, for example, suggests that courts pay special attention to those
materials participants in the drafting process use to “become educated about [a]
bill.”21 Likewise, Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman recommend attention to
different types of legislative history—along with other non-textual sources, such
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 964
& n.212 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] (“The other primary interpretive source
that courts consider—and the one whose use is most hotly contested—is legislative history.”
(collecting cases)); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 353 (2005) [hereinafter
Nelson, What Is Textualism?] (recognizing that “[t]extualists and intentionalists have a wellknown disagreement about the proper use of internal legislative history”); Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1833 (1998) (“Intentionalists and textualists have vigorously debated whether judges
should consult legislative history in statutory interpretation cases.”).
18 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of
Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in question ….”); KATZMANN, supra note
8, at 18-19 (“In that circumstance, beyond the work of their own committees, of which
legislators have direct knowledge, members operate in a system in which they rely on the work
of colleagues on other committees. … Legislators and their staffs become educated about the
bill by reading the materials produced by the committees and conference committees from
which the proposed legislation emanates.”).
19 Nourse, supra note 1, at 143 (“Both textualists and purposivists have to understand how
Congress really works.”); accord KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 8 (“[T]here has been scant
consideration given to what I think is critical as courts discharge their interpretative task—an
appreciation of how Congress actually functions ….”).
20 KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 54. See also Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 989
(“[T]he real question about legislative history is not whether it should be consulted but, rather,
how to separate the useful from the misleading.”); Nourse, supra note 1, at 72 (“Since neither
scholars nor lawyers dispute that, as a matter of fact, legislative history is used, the question is
how it is best used.”).
21 KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 19.
17
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as Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) scores, and structural features like a
statute’s “path through Congress”22—in proportion to the significance assigned
to those sources by “drafters,” i.e. participants in the legislative drafting
process.23 This Article argues that none of this makes sense when context
consists of information salient to all, not to “drafters” in particular. “[I]gnorance
of how Congress works”24 is lamentable for various reasons. But, as this Article
contends, the nuances of the legislative process are largely irrelevant for the
purpose of interpretation.
This Article has three Parts. Part I argues that claims about legislative
intent are pervasive and unavoidable. The argumentative strategy is to identify
various parallels between ordinary conversation and statutory interpretation. In
both conversation and interpretation, this Part explains, an audience is interested
in what proposition(s) a speaker intends to communicate as opposed to what
proposition is, for example, expressed by sentence she utters. And, drawing on
contemporary work in philosophy of language by Charles Travis and other socalled “radical contextualists”25—highly pertinent to but thus far wholly
neglected by the statutory interpretation literature—this Part argues further that,
in each setting, one can most often identify a speaker’s communicative intention
only on the basis of her apparent practical intentions.
Part II argues that claims about legislative intent are systematically false
if taken literally. Under the Constitution, legislative power rests with Congress
as a collective.26 So understood, talk of legislative intent presupposes that the
Congress is capable of forming shared intentions. On any tenable account of
shared agency, however, Congress as structured is systematically incapable of
forming such intentions (other than the bare intention to enact text into law).
Recent scholarship urging greater attention to the legislative process insists that
shared intentions are there to be found if one looks hard enough. This Part
argues that greater attention to process instead supports skepticism about intent
instead.

Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an Empirical Study
of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 780 (2014)
[hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part II].
23 See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 988-89.
24 Nourse, supra note 1, at 85; see also KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 49 (“The paucity of judicial
knowledge about congressional rules and processes relating to the judicial process … is
striking.”).
25 See generally CHARLES TRAVIS, OCCASION SENSITIVITY: SELECTED ESSAYS (2008); FRANCO
̧ IS
RÉCANATI, LITERAL MEANING (2003).
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
22
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Part III argues that, to resolve the tension resulting from Parts I and II,
one should embrace fictionalism about legislative intent. Again, on this
approach, a claim about legislative intent is apt if and only if one would make
that claim about a generic author on the basis of her having written the
legislation at issue in the context of enactment. As Part III explains, fictionalism
does not by itself dictate what information an interpreter should consider as part
of the context of enactment. It does, however, dramatically alter the range of
plausible answers to that question, requiring that any information considered be
of mutual salience to government actors and citizens. Traditionally, the debate
between textualists and purposivists has offered interpreters a choice between
considering just formally adopted materials (e.g., legislative text, prior judicial
decisions) and considering such materials plus certain information of high
salience to government officials (e.g., legislative history). Pursuant to
fictionalism, the choice is, instead, between considering just formally adopted
materials—salient to all in virtue of their formal bindingness—and considering
such materials along with an array of non-textual sources including but not
limited to public speeches and popular media coverage.
I. ATTRIBUTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT ARE UNAVOIDABLE
Claims about legislative intent are pervasive and, contrary to popular
belief, unavoidable. To understand why, bring to mind an ordinary conversation.
There, recognizing a speaker’s intention is integral to efficient and effective
communication. As this Part explains, communication via statute is, as
practiced, no different.27 For that reason, to make sense of legislation in a way
This Article assumes a standard Gricean account of communication according to which the
meaning of words and sentences can be analyzed in terms of speaker intention, in particular the
intention to communicate certain information via the utterance of sentences. See, e.g., PAUL
GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1991). The Gricean framework contrasts with, for
example, a semantic externalist framework, according to which the meaning a term is determined,
in whole or in part, by factors external to the speaker. See, e.g., SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND
NECESSITY (1980). As even its critics acknowledge, the Gricean framework enjoys “almost
universal acceptance” within legal interpretation. Marcin Matczak, Does Legal Interpretation Need
Paul Grice: Reflection on Lepore and Stone’s Imagination and Convention (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (defending an alternative, externalist account of statutory and constitutional
interpretation); see also ERNIE LEPORE & MATTHEW STONE, IMAGINATION AND CONVENTION:
DISTINGUISHING GRAMMAR AND INFERENCE IN LANGUAGE (2014) (defending an externalist
account of communication generally). Courts in particular accept a broadly Gricean—or, in
terms more familiar to legal scholarship, intentionalist—framework more or less without
exception. See, e.g., F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1450 (2012) (“[O]ur task is to determine
what Congress meant by ‘actual.’”); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81,
93 (2007) (“Under this Court's precedents, if the intent of Congress is clear and unambiguously
expressed by the statutory language at issue, that would be the end of our analysis.”); Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285, 98 S. Ct. 566, 573, 54 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1978)
27
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that is at all consistent with our positive law of interpretation, one must attribute
intentions to authors of legislation with much the same frequency as one does
to speakers in ordinary conversation. Legislative intent, it turns out, is not just
a dispensable “metaphor.” 28
A. What Is Meant
What an interlocutor cares about in ordinary conversation is a speaker’s
communicative intent. Take a simple case: it is late morning and A says to B,
“Would you like a bagel?” B responds, “No, thank you. I’ve had breakfast.”
Philosophers of language disagree as to whether, in this context, the sentence
“I’ve had breakfast” expresses the proposition that A has had breakfast at some
point in the past or the proposition that A has had breakfast that morning.29 Where
everyone agrees, of course, is that B intends to communicate the latter
proposition.30 And while the philosophical question regarding sentence
meaning is interesting, for A’s purposes, what matters is that B’s communicative
intention is clear.
The above case is trivial. What it shows is just that, in ordinary
conversation, what is of interest to an interlocutor is what proposition a speaker
intends to communicate. Whether, for instance, that proposition corresponds
to the proposition expressed (assuming there is one) by the uttered sentence is
of interest to philosophers of language. For conversational purposes, however,

(“In the Act, Congress has given a substantial indication of the intended meaning of the term
[at issue].”); United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the
interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language
so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”); see also Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error,
110 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 826 (arguing that “it is well established as a matter of positive law that
the object of inquiry in statutory interpretation is Congress’s communicative intention,
appropriately conceived.”).
28 E.g., John F. Manning, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1924 (2015)
[hereinafter Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind]; Nourse, supra note 1, at 74 (“Let us agree that the
anthropomorphic metaphor portraying Congress as a single person misleads.”).
29 Compare Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 37 (“[T]he speaker … didn’t say that he
hadn’t had breakfast that day. That’s because he left this for inference (notice that this inference
is much harder to make if [the sentence] is uttered late in the day).”) with RÉCANATI, supra note
25 at 21 (“[B]y saying that she’s had breakfast, the speaker implies that she is not hungry and
does not to be fed. … Now th[is] implicature[] can be worked out only if the speaker is
recognized as expressing the (non-minimal) proposition that she’s had breakfast that morning
….”).
30 See Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 38-39.
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what an interlocutor wants to know is what a speaker “means” in a broad,
pragmatic sense.31
The object of inquiry in statutory interpretation is, likewise,
communicative intent as opposed to something like sentence meaning. Another
simple case: the War Powers Resolution states that the President shall
“terminate any use of United States Armed Forces” within sixty days “unless,”
among other things, “the Congress … has declared war.”32 Again, philosophers
dispute whether, as used, this sentence expresses the proposition that the
President shall terminate any military action within sixty days unless the
Congress has declared war at some point in the past or the proposition that she shall
do so unless the Congress has declared war against the target of the hostilities at issue
since the commencement thereof.33 Interpreters agree, of course, that the statute is
correctly interpreted as communicating the latter proposition.34 This is because
(apparent) communicative intention behind the statute is clear.35 For purposes
of interpretation, that is all that matters.
Again, the above case is trivial. What it shows is that, when engaging in
statutory interpretation, what is of interest to courts is what proposition
Congress (apparently) intends to communicate as opposed to, say, the
proposition expressed by the sentence it uses. As before, what courts want to
know is what Congress “means” in a broad, pragmatic sense.36

See Soames, Interpreting Legislative Texts, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 404
(“Semantic content is often merely a vehicle for getting to pragmatically enriched content, and
sometimes the semantic content of a sentence is not itself asserted, or even included in what the
speaker is committed to.”).
32 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
33 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op.
O.L.C. 185, 196 (1980) (“The practical effect of the 60-day limit is to shift the burden to the
President to convince the Congress of the continuing need for the use of our armed forces
abroad.”).
35 Interpreters assume, for instance, that Congress would not intend to enact a requirement that
would be trivially satisfied in all future cases.
36 In other words, an interpreter is interested in what Richard Fallon refers to as a statute’s
“contextual meaning.” Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Meaning of Legal "Meaning" and Its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1235 (2015). Fallon argues that an interpreter
might reasonably be interested in a variety of ‘meanings’ when interpreting a statute (e.g.,
“literal” meaning, “intended” meanings, “reasonable” meaning, “interpreted” meaning). For
reasons articulated below, however, if fictionalism is correct, various candidate ‘meanings’
collapse into one (e.g., “intended” meaning and “reasonable” meaning become one and the
same). See infra notes 233-272 and accompanying text.
31
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B. What Is Asserted
Even where a speaker uses some sentence literally, one must appeal to
the practical context in some if not all cases to determine what proposition that
speaker intends to assert or, alternatively, what a speaker intends to claim.37
“Context,” for these purposes, consists of the information that is “salient” or
“relevant” to conversational participants.38 And what information is “salient”
or “relevant” depends in part upon shared or individual practical ends of the
participants.39 For that reason, to determine what a speaker intends to assert or
to claim, one must, in some if not all cases, determine what she (and/or her
interlocutors) intends to do.
Courts too must appeal to context to determine what Congress
(apparently) intends to assert even where it is assumed that Congress uses a
sentence literally. And, as with ordinary conversation, such appeals to “context”
involve an assessment of what practical ends are at issue. Often, courts appeal
to context to determine Congress’ (apparent) communicative intent in so-called
“hard” cases.40 As the discussion below illustrates, however, appeal to context
is important but often unnoticed in “easy” cases as well.
1. Ambiguity
First, appeal to a speaker’s practical ends can be necessary for an
interlocutor to resolve lexical or structural ambiguities in the words the speaker
utters. A familiar example: suppose that A says to B, “I will be at the bank this
afternoon.” To resolve the lexical ambiguity, i.e. whether “bank,” as used, refers
to a river side or a financial institution, B will appeal to what it is that A (with B,
See Kent Bach, You Don’t Say?, 128 SYNTHESE 15, 28 (2001) (arguing that intuitions concerning
the truth of a particular utterance pertain to “what a speaker is claiming,” as opposed to “what
he is saying”).
38 Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 21 (“What is loosely called ‘context’ is the
conversational setting broadly construed. It is the mutual cognitive context, or salient common
ground. It includes ...salient mutual knowledge between the conversants, and relevant broader
common knowledge”).
39 See, e.g., Predelli, supra note 15, at 365 (observing that one must take into account “what
intuitively matters” in a conversational context to evaluate the truth of a claim); Robert C.
Stalnaker, Assertion, in CONTEXT AND CONTENT 78, 79 (1999) (“In particular inquiries,
deliberations, and conversations, alternative states of the subject matter in question are
conceived in different ways depending on the interests and attitudes of the participants in those
activities.” (emphasis added)).
40 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) (“The problem of justifying
judicial decisions is particularly acute in ‘hard cases,’ those cases in which the result is not clearly
dictated by statute or precedent.”).
37
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perhaps) plans to do (e.g., to go fishing, to complete a financial transaction, etc.).
Another example: suppose that A cautions B, “Flying planes can be dangerous.”
To resolve the structural ambiguity, i.e. whether the words form a sentence that
expresses the proposition that the act of flying planes can be dangerous or a
sentence that expresses the proposition that planes that are flying can be
dangerous, B must discern A’s apparent end (e.g., to discourage B from
becoming a pilot, to persuade B not to go skydiving near the airport, etc.).
Courts too must appeal to context to resolve lexical and structural
ambiguities in the words that Congress selects. As to lexical ambiguity, appeal
to context can be necessary where a statute contains a word or phrase has two
or more possible meanings. Title VII, for example, states that it shall be
unlawful for an employer to “discharge” an individual on the basis of her race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.41 Courts (rightly) take it as obvious that
“discharge,” as used, refers to terminating employment as oppose to, say,
shooting out of a canon.42 In so doing, however, courts (latently) attribute to
Congress concern with discriminatory employment (as opposed to ammunition)
decisions. As to structural ambiguity, courts often must appeal to context
where, for instance, a statute contains an adjective, adverb, or prepositional
phrase adjacent to a list of nouns or verbs. For instance, the federal aggravated
identity theft statute mandates an additional term of imprisonment of two years
for one who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses” a form of identification
of another person without lawful authority during or in relation to a covered
felony.43 Courts rightly treat it as plain that, as used, “knowingly” modifies
“transfers,” “possesses,” and “uses” (as opposed to, say, just “transfers”).44 In
so doing, however, courts (latently) appeal to what it is that Congress is trying
to do, namely punish knowing misconduct.45

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
See, e.g., Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004); McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 354 (1995).
43 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
44 See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 648 (2009) (“All parties agree that the
provision applies only where the offender knows that he is transferring, possessing, or using
something.”); cf. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (treating it as obvious that the
federal statute governing food stamp fraud, which criminalizes the “knowing[] use[], transfer[],
acqui[sition], alter[ation], or possess[ion]” of coupons or authorization cards in a manner not
authorized by the statute or regulation, applies only to knowing acquisition).
45 Harder is whether “knowingly” modifies “without lawful authority.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1);
cf. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 (holding that the word “knowingly,” as used in the statute governing
food stamp fraud, modified the phrase “in any manner not authorized by [law]”).
41
42
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2. Pragmatic Enrichment
Second, appeal to a speaker’s practical ends can be necessary in cases of
what some philosophers or language call “expansion”46 or “pragmatic
enrichment.”47 Consider: if A says to B, “I’m ready,” one must appeal to features
of the practical context to determine whether A intends to assert/claim that she
is ready to leave for dinner, ready to enter the game, etc.48 In such a case, appeal
to context is required to fill in the words the speaker omits. 49 One can accept
this regardless of what proposition (if any) one understands the sentence “I’m
ready” to express in context.50
Courts similarly must appeal to Congress’ practical ends in such cases.
Section 102(b)(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a “qualified individual” on the
basis of disability with respect to hiring.51 Courts (reasonably) take it as obvious
that, as used, “qualified individual” refers to an individual qualified for the position
for which she applied (as opposed to, say, qualified to operate a motor vehicle or qualified
to vote).52 To arrive at this (surely correct) interpretation, however, one must
attribute to Congress concern with a particular kind of discrimination, namely
hiring discrimination against persons with the requisite skills. Examples of this
sort abound.53

Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 124 (1994) [hereinafter Bach,
Conversational Implicature].
47 E.g., François Récanati, Pragmatic Enrichment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 67, 70 (Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara eds., 2012).
48 Other examples include sentences such as “Steel isn’t strong enough” and “The princess is
late.” Bach, Conversational Impliciture, supra note 46, at 127-28.
49 See Kent Bach, Speaking Loosely: Sentence Nonliterality, 25 MW. STUD. PHIL. 249, 250 (2001)
(“[W]e commonly speak loosely, by omitting words that could have made what we meant more
explicit, and we let our audience fill in the gaps. Language works far more efficiently when we
do that.”).
50 Compare, e.g., Bach, Conversational Impliciture, supra note 46, at 127 (arguing that such sentences
fail to express complete propositions) with HERMAN CAPPELEN & ERNIE LEPORE, INSENSITIVE
SEMANTICS: A DEFENSE OF
SEMANTIC MINIMALISM AND SPEECH ACT PLURALISM 168-69 (2005) (arguing that such
sentences express minimal propositions such as that A is just plain ready).
51 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
52 Larimer v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“The
term ‘qualified individual’ in that provision must simply mean qualified to do one’s job, as
assumed though nowhere discussed in the legislative history and the cases.” (citations omitted)).
53 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 60111(a) (authorizing Secretary of Transportation to issue notice if an
operator of a liquefied natural gas facility lacks “adequate financial responsibility for the facility
[for safety purposes]”).
46
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3. Travis Cases
Third, appeal to a speaker’s practical ends might be necessary as a matter
of course.54 Charles Travis has put forward a variety of ingenious cases to
suggest that the proposition expressed by a prima facie context-insensitive
sentence nonetheless varies by context.55 For instance, Travis observes that
whether a speaker says something true when uttering the sentence “The leaves
are green” plausibly depends upon the practical interests at issue:
A story. Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing
that green is the colour of leaves, she paints them. Returning,
she reports, ‘That’s better. The leaves are green now.’ She
speaks truth. A botanist friend then phones, seeking green
leaves for a study of green-leaf chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my
tree) are green,’ Pia says. ‘You can have those.’ But now Pia
speaks falsehood.56
One may or may not be convinced that so-called “Travis cases”57 demonstrate
global “semantic underdeterminacy” of sentences.58 One must concede,
however, that such cases show that appeal to context can be—and, perhaps, is
always—necessary to determine what proposition a speaker intends to assert

Cf. Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 26-27 (“Even if what a speaker means consists
precisely in the semantic content of the sentence he utters and that content is precise, this fact
is not determined by the semantic content of the sentence. The reason for this claim is very
simple: no sentence has to be used in accordance with its semantic content. Any sentence can
be used in a nonliteral or indirect way. A speaker can always mean something distinct from the
semantic content of the sentence he is uttering.”)
55 See, e.g., Charles Travis, Meaning’s Role in Truth, 105 MIND 451 (1996); Charles Travis, On What
Is Strictly Speaking True, 15 CAN. J. PHIL. 187 (1985).
56 Charles Travis, Pragmatics, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 87, 89 (Bob
Hale & Crispin Wright eds., 1997).
57 E.g., Agustin Vicente, On Travis Cases, 35 LING. & PHIL. 3 (2012).
58 See, e.g., Martin Montminy, Two Contextualist Fallacies, 3 SYNTHESE 317 (2010) (arguing that
radical contextualist arguments for global semantic underdeterminacy rest on two fallacies);
Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (2008)
(“It is true that the compositional nature of language—the ability to understand sentences we
have never heard before—is one of the hardest and most complex of questions concerning the
nature of language. But anything even residing in the neighborhood of the ‘meaning is use on
a particular occasion’ view of language fails even to address the compositional problem ….”).
54
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(or, perhaps, the truth-conditions of what she asserts59) even if the sentence she
utters contains no obviously context-sensitive component.60
Courts too plausibly must appeal to context even where Congress uses
sentences that are prima facie context-insensitive. An example. During a tour of
the White House, A steals a pen from the President’s desk. About to exit the
property, a Secret Service Officer asks A to stop. A panics and fatally stabs the
Officer with the stolen pen. A then shoves the pen into her bag, jumps into a
cab, and speeds to the airport. At the airport, A proceeds to the security check,
where a TSA agent, invoking the federal prohibiting carrying a concealed
dangerous weapon on an aircraft, asks her “Are you carrying a dangerous
weapon?”61 A says, “No,” speaking truly.62 A continues on to the gate, where
she is apprehended by the police. Invoking the enhanced penalty provision of
the federal statute prohibiting forcible assault on a federal officer asks, “Are you
carrying a dangerous weapon?”63 A says, “No,” speaking falsely.64
Again, the above example is fantastical. The principle it illustrates,
however, is straightforward. Even where a statute uses some prima facie contextinsensitive predicate F (e.g., is a dangerous weapon, weighs one gram or more65),
whether some object X (e.g., A’s pen, B’s stash of LSD tabs66) “counts as”67 F
might depend upon the practical interests implicated by that legislation. So long
See John MacFarlane, Nonindexical Contextualism, 166 SYNTHESE 231, 246 (2009)
(hypothesizing a “‘counts-as’ parameter” that “settles what things have to be like to have various
properties: e.g. the property of weighing 160 pounds, or of being tall”).
60 What is distinctive about Travis cases is that such cases suggest intuitions about truth-values
depend upon context even when the sentence uttered contains no demonstrative, indexical, etc.
61 See 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b)(1) (criminalizing attempt to board an aircraft while concealing a
“dangerous weapon” that would be accessible during flight).
62 See United States v. Dishman, 486 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a starter pistol
incapable of firing a projectile was not a “deadly or dangerous weapon” within the proscription
of § 46505’s predecessor statute, reasoning that “the proscribed weapon must be one that is a
“deadly and dangerous” weapon per se or inherently so through its construction”).
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (providing for enhanced penalties where an individual uses a “deadly
or dangerous weapon” in the course of forcibly assaulting a federal officer).
64 See United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that an automobile
may qualify as a “deadly weapon” for purposes of § 111(b) if used as such, accepting that “[f]or
an object that is not inherently deadly, … the object must be capable of causing serious bodily
injury or death to another person and the defendant must use it in that manner”).
65 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(v) (establishing a mandatory minimum sentence of five-years’
imprisonment for distribution of “1 gram or more” of a “mixture or substance” containing a
detectable amount of LSD).
66 See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (holding that, for purposes of § 841(b)(v),
weight of “mixture or substance” containing a detectable amount of LSD includes weight of
blotter paper).
67 MacFarlane, supra note 59, at 246.
59
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as there exist two practical contexts, one in which “X is F” expresses a truth and
one in which it expresses a falsehood, one must appeal to context to determine
whether X “counts as” F for purposes of the statute at issue.

C. What Is Implied, Intimated, Etc.
Last, what a speaker intends to communicate often exceeds what she
asserts. The most familiar cases here are those of “implicature,” a phenomenon
explored famously by Paul Grice.68 Implicature is a form of indirect
communication. If, for example, A asks B, “Would you like coffee or tea?” and
B responds, “I would like coffee,” all agree that B has not asserted the
proposition that B would not like tea. Be that as it may, all agree that B intends
to communicate that proposition (e.g., A knows not to bring coffee and tea).69
Or suppose that A asks B, “Do you know where I can get some gas?,” and B
responds, “There is a gas station around the corner.”70 All accept that B has not
asserted that the gas station around the corner is open for business.
Nonetheless, it is clear to all that B intends to communicate that proposition
(e.g., A need not follow up with, “Okay, but is it open?”).71
Using implicature to communicate more than one asserts advances a
variety of ends.72 Most relevant here, using implicature promotes verbal
efficiency: Through implicature a speaker can communicate multiple
propositions by uttering a single sentence.73
Courts likewise regularly attribute to Congress the intention to
communicate more than it asserts. In particular, courts recognize many of the
same sorts of Gricean implicatures as do interlocutors in ordinary conversation.
Where, for example, a statute contains a provision defining its pre-emptive
reach, courts will assume, absent additional evidence, that Congress intends not
See H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, VOLUME 3: SPEECH ACTS
(Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
69 See id. at 45 (identifying maxim of “quantity,” i.e. maxim that one should “[m]ake [one’s]
contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)”).
70 See id. at 51.
71 See id. at 46 (identifying maxim of “relation,” i.e. maxim that one should “[b]e relevant”).
72 See, e.g., PENELOPE BROWN & STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, POLITENESS. SOME UNIVERSALS IN
LANGUAGE USAGE (1987) (arguing that indirect speech can be used to promote the value of
politeness).
73 See STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE THEORY OF GENERALIZED
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 28-31 (2000); cf. Elizabeth Camp, Metaphor and that certain ‘je ne
sais quoi’, 129 MIND & LANGUAGE 1, 3 (2006) (“Because metaphorical utterances … express
such complex contents in so few words, they are highly efficient vehicles for communication.”).
68

17

HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS

8/1/2016 1:59 PM

to pre-empt matters outside that reach.74 Or where a statute expressly creates a
right, courts will assume, other things equal, that Congress intends there to be a
corresponding remedy.75
Scholars dispute whether Grice’s account of implicature “readily
translate[s] from the conversational setting to the complex, multilateral
bargaining process of framing a statute.”76 All agree, however, that implicature
does and should play some role in statutory interpretation—no one disputes, for
example, that application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon is
legitimate in some cases.77 As in the conversational context, the use of
implicature, however restricted, promotes verbal efficiency.78 To require that
legislation make explicit every proposition communicated would be
cumbersome if not practically impossible.
*****
To sum up: statutory interpretation as practiced involves widespread
attribution of legislative intent. First, in all cases, what is of interest to an
interpreter is the proposition(s) Congress (apparently) intends to communicate
as opposed to, say, the proposition expressed by the sentence Congress used.
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (“Congress’ enactment of a provision
defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted.”)).
75 See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916) (inferring a private right of action
from a statutory requirement, reasoning that “[t]his is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus
ibi remedium,” i.e. where there is a right there is a remedy).
76 Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 12, at 2462 n. 274; see also Andrei Marmor, Can the
Law Imply More Than It Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in LANGUAGE IN THE
LAW 81 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (arguing that, unlike ordinary conversation,
conversation in the legal context is often strategic and so allows for only limited pragmatic
inference); Soames, Interpreting Legislative Texts, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
422 (“The legislative process is governed by purposes that transcend, and sometimes conflict
with, the conversational ideal of the efficient and cooperative exchange of information.
Consequently, the way in which conversational maxims based on this ideal contribute to filling
the gap between the meaning and content of legal texts may, in some cases, differ from their
contribution to filling similar gaps in ordinary conversations.”).
77 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 179 (2011) (“Consider the
once-dreaded maxim of negative implication, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The specification
of one thing surely does not always mean the exclusion of others. … Still, while there is no
master rule that can tell us when the maxim applies, that does not mean that skilled users of
language are utterly unable to identify when a speaker has used language in a way that creates a
negative implication. We do so all the time. Sometimes the maxim’s applicability is obvious;
other times, it is subject to reasonable disagreement.” (footnotes omitted)).
78 Less clear is whether values such as politeness are implicated by the legislative context. See
supra note 72.
74
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Second, in most if not all cases, an interpreter must attribute to Congress various
practical intentions79 in order to attribute to it a communicative intention.
Attributions of practical intent are often latent. Such attributions are, however,
necessary if one is to understand legislation as an effective means of
communication—which, as a matter of positive law, courts plainly do.80 It is
possible—though, in the author’s view, highly doubtful—that courts are
mistaken in thinking of legislation as a means of communication.81 Legislationas-communication has intuitive appeal, and is, for that reason, the “standard
picture” among legal theorists.82 In addition, it is the “law of interpretation”
within our federal system,83 or, perhaps better, the positive law of “what the
This Article uses the phrase “practical intention” to refer to both general and specific practical
aims. As used, the phrase thus encompasses what Mark Greenberg and others refer to as “legal
intention,” i.e. the intention to alter legal rights or obligations in a particular way. Mark
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott
Soames eds., 2011) [hereinafter Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?]. To go back to the
WPR example, the intention that one attributes to Congress to limit the President’s authority to
engage in hostilities without congressional approval is plausibly a legal intention in Greenberg’s
sense. Nonetheless, this Article characterizes it as a practical intention for the reason that it is
intuitively glossed as what Congress is trying to do, as opposed to what Congress is attempting
to say. Of course, one could, in addition, attribute to Congress on the basis of its enacting the
WPR the more general practical intention of, say, maintaining the separation of powers or
reducing the frequency of significant military intervention. The point here is just that the phrase
“practical intention,” as used, is not limited to such general aims or purposes.
80 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 n.4 (2015) (“Congress said expressly that it
wanted to avoid adverse selection in the health insurance markets.”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014) ( “Congress speaks with specificity when it intends a
religious accommodation not to extend to for-profit corporations”); Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848, 858 (2000) ( “Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite ….”
(quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–222 (1952)); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (“First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter ….”)); United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc., 337
U.S. 78, 84 (1949) (“Congress indeed meant what it said ….”); United States v. Am. Sugar Ref.
Co., 202 U.S. 563, 577 (1906) (“[I]t is the meaning of Congress … we are to ascertain ….”);
The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 274, 22 S. Ct. 102, 106, 46 L. Ed. 190 (1902) (“Congress meant
by the[se] words … but one thing ….”).
81 For arguments that legislation should not be regarded as a means of communication, see, e.g.,
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?; Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945
(1990). Assessing the merits of these arguments goes beyond the scope of this Article.
82 Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of the Law, 123 YALE L. J. 1288, 1296-97 (2014)
(describing the “standard picture” as the view that “the content of the law is primarily
constituted by linguistic (or mental) contents associated with the authoritative legal texts,”
observing that the picture “has deep roots in ordinary thought about the law,” and is
“encapsulated in the layperson’s idea that the law is what the code or law books say”).
83 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2017); cf. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349 (2015)
79
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[statutory] law is.”84 For these reasons, this Article assumes the picture of
legislation as communication arguendo. And, given that picture, attributions of
legislative intent, both communicative and practical, are to a large degree
unavoidable.
Among other things, the above-identified need to attribute to Congress
practical intentions calls into question the textualist claim that, when interpreting
a statute, one should prioritize so-called “semantic context” over “policy
context.”85 According to John Manning, “semantic context” consists of
“evidence that goes to the way a reasonable person would use language under
the circumstances.”86 Included in “semantic context” are such things as
“dictionary definitions,” “specialized trade usage,” and “colloquial nuances that
may be widely understood but that are unrecorded in standard dictionaries.”87
“Policy context,” by contrast, consists of “evidence that suggests the way a
reasonable person would address the mischief being remedied.”88 Within the
ambit of “policy context” are:
[M]atters such as public knowledge of the mischief the
lawmakers sought to address; the way competing interpretations
of a discrete statutory provision fit with the policy reflected in
the statute’s preamble, title, or overall structure; and the way
alternative readings of the statute fit with the policy expressed in
similar statutes.89
Manning argues that “[w]hen contextual evidence of semantic usage points
decisively in one direction, that evidence takes priority over contextual evidence
that relates to questions of policy.”90 What Travis cases in particular suggest,
however, is that, to determine what a speaker intends to say, one must, in nearly
(articulating a positive law argument for originalism about constitutional interpretation); Stephen
E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2015) (same).
84 See Mitchell Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009) (noting the distinction
“between what the law is and what judges should do” when interpreting a legal text).
85 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76 (2006)
[hereinafter Manning, What Divides?]; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between
Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation-and the Irreducible Roles of Values and
Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 693 (2014) [hereinafter Fallon, Three Symmetries]
(observing that “Professor Manning's distinction between semantic contexts and policy contexts
hav[e] achieved broad acceptance”).
86 Manning, What Divides?, supra note 85, at 76.
87 Id. at 92.
88 Id. at 76.
89 Id. at 93.
90 Id. at 92-93.
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all instances, determine first what she intends to do.91 In most cases, what a
speaker intends to do is obvious, making the corresponding determination
unthinking or automatic. Nonetheless, is it a determination a listener must
make. With respect to statutes, this suggests that “evidence of semantic usage”
is rarely clear when considered apart from evidence of “the mischief being
remedied.” Again, very often, that “mischief” will be so apparent that it will not
require conscious consideration. All the same, even in easy cases, what the
legislature intends to do must be taken into account. As this Article explains
below, the question remains what sources an interpreter should consider when
making sense of a statute. This claim here is just that, in most cases, one cannot
determine how “a reasonable person would use language under the
circumstances” apart from evidence of purpose, whatever the source.
II. CONGRESS AS SUCH HAS NO INTENTIONS
So attributions of legislative intent are widespread and seemingly
unavoidable. The problem is there is no legislative intent. At least not in the
United States Congress. As this Part explains, the Constitution vests the
legislative power in Congress as a collective. On any plausible account of shared
agency, however, Congress as structured is systematically incapable of forming
collective intentions (other than the bare intention to enact text into law). As a
consequence, attributions to Congress of legislative intent in the familiar sense
are systematically false.
A. Congress Is an “It,” Not a “They”
As far as the Constitution is concerned, Congress is an “it,” not a “they.”
Article I, § 1 vests all legislative powers in “a Congress.”92 The Constitution also
specifies various things “the Congress” may or shall do.93 In each instance, the
This cuts against the argument voiced by Joseph Raz that legislative intent “plays no real role”
in interpretation because, barring specific exceptions, “one means what one says.” RAZ, supra
note 7, at 286-87; see also id. at 287 (“[T]he normal way of finding out what a person intended to
say is to establish what he said. The thought that the process can be reversed mistakes the
exceptional case … for the normal case”). If determining what a speaker “says” requires
attention to the practical circumstances in most cases, Congress’s practical ends have an
important role in interpretation most of the time.
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
93 See, e.g., id. § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes …”); id. cl. 8
(“[The Congress shall have the power to] [t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads ….”); id.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of … inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”).
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Constitution refers to Congress as a collective as opposed to a mere set of
individuals. To illustrate, when a disgruntled citizen says, “Congress is out of
touch,”94 her claim is best understood as something like that most members of
Congress are out of touch.95 So taken, the claim that Congress is corrupt is akin
to the claim that ravens are black or that the 12th Man cheers the Seattle
Seahawks; it a generic ascription of a trait to the individuals that constitute the
referenced set.96 By contrast, when the Constitution says, “[T]he Congress may
… establish [inferior courts],”97 the takeaway is not that a generic member of
Congress may establish such a court on her own. Rather, it is that Congress
may do so as a collective, much in the same way that the Villanova Wildcats may
win the NCAA championship or that the Supreme Court may grant certiorari.
The above might seem obvious. One must bear it in mind, however,
when thinking about the slogan that Congress is a “they,” not an “it.”98 As
discussed below, that slogan was introduced as a banner for skepticism about
legislative intent. But, more recently, it has come to border on truism, accepted
even by some who find recognition of legislative intent unproblematic.99 This
broad, casual acceptance of the thesis that Congress is a “they” makes little
sense. If the legislative power belongs to Congress as a collective, the choice is
stark: either Congress forms intentions qua “it” or there is no legislative intent.
B. Traditional Skepticism
Traditional skepticism about legislative intent is rooted in skepticism
about the aggregability of attitudes of legislators.100 In one form, traditional
Letters to the Editor, Congress Out of Touch with America, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 24,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-congress-out-of-touch-withamerica/2014/06/24/4b1a8fae-fadb-11e3-9f27-09f20b8bfd1a_story.html.
95 See id. (citing as evidence that Congress is out of touch that “House Majority Leader Eric
Cantor (Va.) is … out of touch”).
96 See Sarah-Jane Leslie, Generics, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
Craig ed., 2011), http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/U059.
97 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
98 Shepsle, supra note 6.
99 See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 737 (acknowledging “Kenneth Shepsle’s
famous insight that Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80
GEORGETOWN L.J. 705, 711 (1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons] (“As Kenneth
Shepsle reminds us, ‘Congress is a they, not an it.’”).
100 Traditional skepticism has historical roots in an influential article by Max Radin. See Max
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“The chances that of several
hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible
reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small.”).
94
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skepticism fixes on legislator preference. As public-choice theorists observe,
majority preference of a legislative body need not be transitive, i.e. a majority of
legislators might prefer X to Y and Y to Z, but also Z to X.101 For this reason,
the legislative process is susceptible to “cycling” unless structured produce a
final vote.102 But this means that legislative outcomes might be owed to “agenda
sett[ing],” i.e. control over on what gets voted and when,103 making it impossible
to “differentiate,” in a given case, “the ‘will of the majority’ from the
machinations … of agenda setters.”104 Alternatively, legislative outcomes might
be owed to “logrolling,” i.e. strategic trading of votes between legislators.105
Logrolling “yields unanimity on every recorded vote,” masking substantive
policy disagreement.106 “[T]he legislative process is,” thereby, “submerged,” and
“courts lose the information they need to divine the body’s design.”107 Or so
the argument goes.
In its other form, traditional skepticism fixes on legislator intention. The
legislative process does not require legislators to prefer one policy to another
for the same reasons.108 Thus, even where substantive policy preferences align,
different legislators might have in mind different ends—for instance, Legislator
A might prefer policy X to policy Y because she believes policy X will be more
efficacious while Legislator B might do so because she believes that policy X
will be less efficacious but an adequate fig leaf.109 In such a scenario, “there is

See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 241-44; see also Leo Katz, A Theory of Loopholes, 39 J. LEGAL STUD.
1,
11–12 (2010) (providing an illustration).
102 Shepsle, supra note 6, at 241-44
103 Id. at 246 (noting “structural advantages of agenda setters, both in determining what the full
chamber may vote on and when (proposal power), and more subtly on what the full chamber
may not vote on (veto power)”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 547-48 (“Legislators
customarily consider proposals one at a time. … Additional options can be considered only in
sequence, and this makes the order of decision vital.”).
104 Shepsle, supra note 6, at 248.
105 Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 548.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 244 (“[T]he winning majority consists of many legislators; their
respective reasons for voting against the status quo may well be as varied as their number.”); see
also
Timothy
W.
Grinsell,
Linguistics
and
Legislative
Intent,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2471026 (“Shepsle and Easterbrook
both treat the problem of ‘many intents’ as independent of the Arrowian-based argument. To
some degree, it is: individual legislators may have the same ranking of proposals for entirely different
reasons.” (footnote omitted)).
109 See, e.g., Health-Care Cooperatives: Fig Leaf or Fix?, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (August 18,
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-08-18/health-care-cooperatives-fig-leafor-fix-businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (discussing, in the
101
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not a single legislative intent, but rather many legislators’ intents.”110 And one
simply has no way of knowing whether such a scenario obtains.111
Traditional skepticism draws various responses. Some question the
frequency with which cycling occurs in practice. Daniel Farber and Philip
Frickey, for example, maintain that social choice theory’s predictions of
arbitrariness and instability are “markedly inconsistent with our empirical
knowledge of legislatures such as the U.S. Congress.”112 Among other things,
Farber and Frickey cite Congress’ committee structure and the distribution of
member preferences along a “unidimensional, liberal-conservative spectrum” as
making cycling unlikely.113 Others insist that skeptical fears ought to be dispelled
simply by the familiar practice of attributing intentions to multi-member bodies
such as corporations. Justice Stephen Breyer reasons, for instance, that
“[c]orporations, companies, partnerships, municipalities, states, nations, armies,
bar associations, and legislatures engage in intentional activities, such as buying,
selling, promising, endorsing, questioning, undertaking, repudiating, and
legislating.”114 “Linguistic and social conventions (complicated but well
understood),” Breyer assures, “tell us when and how to attribute purposes to
these bodies.”115 Others still observe that the possibility of cycling is not unique
to the decisions of multi-member bodies. Timothy Grinsell explains that cycling
can occur where individuals apply multicriterial predicates, i.e. predicates that
denote a decision function aggregating multiple criteria into a single judgment,
such as “healthy” or “nice.”116 Because we have no difficulty attributing
coherent intentions to individuals who apply such predicates, Grinsell argues,
context of the ACA, whether proposed healthcare cooperatives are an effective substitute for
previously advocated public insurance option).
110 Sheplse, supra note 6, at 244.
111 See id. at 248 (“When a bill passes the House and Senate in the same form, and is signed by
the president, there are only limited inferences to be drawn. We know that one majority in each
chamber has revealed a “preference” for the bill over x 0. We do not know why, and it is likely
that each legislator has a mix of different reasons.”).
112 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev.
423, 430 (1988).
113 Id.
114 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 99 (2011)
[hereinafter BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK].
115 Id.; see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845, 864-65 (1992) (“One often ascribes ‘group’ purposes to group actions. A law school
raises tuition to obtain money for a new library. A basketball team stalls to run out the clock.
A tank corps feints to draw the enemy’s troops away from the main front. … All this is to say
that ascribing purposes to groups and institutions is a complex business, and one that is often
difficult to describe abstractly. But that fact does not make such ascriptions improper. In
practice, we ascribe purposes to group activities all the time without many practical difficulties.”).
116 Grinsell, supra note 108.
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the mere possibility of cycling cannot be enough to render problematic
attributions of intentions to legislatures.117
The above responses draw their own responses.118 What this Part
suggests, however, is that this whole dialectic misses the fundamental problem
with attributions of legislative intent. A premise of traditional skepticism—
unquestioned by the abovementioned respondents—is that the aggregability of
legislator attitudes is a necessary (and, perhaps, sufficient) condition for
legislative intent. That premise is squarely at odds with philosophical accounts
of shared agency, which recognize that, for there to be shared intention,
aggregability is neither necessary nor sufficient.
C. Accounts of Shared Agency
Sometimes we act side by side. Other times we act together.
Philosophical accounts of shared agency try to make sense of the difference.
Take Margaret Gilbert’s example of taking a walk.119 Suppose that you
and I walk next to each other through the park but each is unaware of or
indifferent to the other. In this case, you and I each walk alone in some sense.120
Suppose now that you and I each walk the same path but do so as part of a date.
In this case, you and I walk together in the sense that we are engaged in a “shared
cooperative activity.”121 In each case, our external behavior is the same. What
differ are our respective intentions.122 In the first case, I intend that I walk
through the park and you intend that you do the same. In the second case, each
See id. at *3 (“Since … the public choice argument applies with equal force to decisions made
by legislatures and to decisions made by individuals, the notions of legislative intent and
individual intent stand or fall together. And we should let them stand.” (footnote omitted)).
118 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 789–93 (2005) (arguing
that cycling can be common and is often unseen because it is pushed back in the legislative
process); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative
Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981) (arguing that the absence of apparent cycling does not imply
the absence of preferences that induce cycling).
119 See Margaret Gilbert, Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon, 15 MW. STUD. PHIL.
1 (1990).
120 See id. at 2 (“Imagine that Sue Jones is out for a walk along Horsebarn Road on her own.
Suddenly she realizes that someone else-a man in a black cloak-has begun to walk alongside her,
about a foot away. His physical proximity is clearly not enough to make it the case that they are
going for a walk together. It may disturb Sue precisely because they are not going for a walk
together.”).
121 Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327 (1992).
122 Cf. Searle, supra note 5, at 403 (discussing analogous examples, observing that “[e]xternally
observed the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly different internally.”).
117
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of us intends that we walk through the park. It is this “we-intention,”123
philosophers suggest, that distinguishes our shared cooperative activity from a
“mere summation or heap of individual acts.”124
For there to be shared cooperative activity, we-intentions must be shared.
At a minimum,125 this means that, for a collective as such to φ, its members—
either all or sufficiently many126—must each intend that “we” φ.127 If, for
example, I intend that we walk through the park but you are unaware of my
presence, we do not walk together (despite my mistaken belief that we do128). In
addition, each member’s intention that “we” φ must be transparent, i.e. each

Id. at 404.
Abraham S. Roth, Shared Agency, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/shared-agency/. Philosophers disagree as
to whether we intentions can be reduced to ordinary individual intentions. Compare, e.g.,
BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 4 (“[I]ndividual planning agency brings with it
sufficiently rich structures—conceptual, metaphysical, and normative—that the further step to
basic forms of sociality, while significant and demanding, need not involve fundamentally new
elements.”) with Searle, supra note 5, at 407 (arguing that “we-intentions are a primitive
phenomenon” and that we intentions are “not reducible to I-intentions plus mutual beliefs”).
Where philosophers agree is that some sort of “participatory intention” is a necessary condition
of shared agency. Christopher Kutz, Acting Together, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH 1, 3 (2000).
125 This Article identifies only certain necessary conditions of shared agency. What conditions
suffice for shared agency goes beyond the scope of this Article and is a matter of philosophical
dispute.
126 Whether an intention need be shared by all or sufficiently many members to be attributed to
a group plausibly depends upon whether that group is “ephemeral” or “institutional.” See id. at
28. Ephemeral groups, according to Christopher Kutz, “are groups whose identity as a group
consists just in the fact that a set of persons is acting jointly” (e.g., a group pushing a car). Id.
Institutional groups, in contrast, have additional identity criteria (e.g., to be a member of the
U.S. Senate, it is not enough for one to “intentionally participat[e] in its deliberations; one must
instead be elected in accordance with operative elections procedures). Id. at 28-29. In the case
of ephemeral groups, it seems straightforward that all members of a group must share an
intention to φ for that intention to be attributed to the group: what makes that group a group,
after all, is just its shared intention to φ. Compare this to institutional groups such as the U.S.
Senate: because the Senate exists as a group for reasons apart from its members shared intention
to φ, it is at least plausible that one could attribute to the Senate an intention to φ if a large
enough subset of senators shared that intention. This Article need not answer this question.
127 See BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 152 (identifying as a necessary condition of
shared agency that “[w]e each have intentions that we J”); GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT, supra
note 5, at 7 (“[I]n the process of joint commitment, two or more people jointly commit the same
two or more people.” (emphasis omitted)).
128 For me to believe that we walk together, I must believe that we share an intention to do so.
See BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 42 (“Of course, an individual may have an
intention he would express as ‘we will do it,’ and yet be mistaken that his use of ‘we’ succeeds
in referring. Perhaps he is a brain in a vat. But in that case there is no shared intention ….”).
123
124
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member must recognize that each other member also intends that “we” φ.129
Hence, if each of us intends that we walk through the park but each keeps that
intention a secret, we do not (yet130) walk as a joint venture. Last, members must
intend to coordinate their efforts toward φing.131 We do not share an intention
that we walk through the park if, for instance, we make no effort to walk at the
same pace.
Whenever there is an instance of shared cooperative activity, one can, in
a minimal sense, correctly attribute an intentional action to a collective as such.
When, for example, you and I walk through the park together, one can truthfully
say that we walk through the park in a way that one cannot when you and I
merely walk side by side. Likewise, whenever one can correctly attribute an
intentional action to a collective, one can, again, in a minimal sense, correctly
attribute an intention to that collective. Hence, when we walk through the park,
one can ascribe to us the intention to do so in a way that one cannot when you
and I each walk alone. Philosophers disagree as to whether and to what extent
collective action must involve collective agents in some metaphysically interesting
way.132 Similarly, philosophers disagree as to whether and under what conditions
it makes sense to regard a collective as constituting a “group mind” to which
one could reasonably attribute cognitive attitudes.133 This Article need not wade
See, e.g., GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT, supra note 5, at 7 (“In the basic case [of joint
commitment], … each makes clear to each his personal readiness to contribute to it, in a way
that is entirely out in the open to all.”); Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 97, 99
n.8 (identifying “common knowledge” as a necessary condition of shared agency).
130 Assuming we are not confused, each of us intends in this case that we walk together at some
point in the (near) future. See supra note 128. For us to succeed, we must disclose our respective
intentions to one another prior to our walk. See GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT, supra note 5, at
29 (describing mutual expression of intention to walk together resulting in a “joint decision” to
do so)..
131 See BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 52 (“If we share an intention to go to NYC,
and if you intend that we go to NYC by taking the New Jersey local train while I intend that we
go by taking the Amtrak train, we have a problem. In a case of shared intention we will normally
try to resolve that problem by making adjustments in one or both of these sub-plans, perhaps
by the way of bargaining, in the direction of co-possibility.”).
132 Compare Philip Pettit & David Schweikard, Joint Actions and Group Agents, PHIL. SOC. SCI. 18,
30 (2006) (seeing “no metaphysical reason why a joint intentional action has to be the product
of a single agent”) with Margaret Gilbert, What Is It for Us to Intend?, in SOCIALITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 14, 22 (2000) [hereinafter Gilbert,
What Is It?] (reasoning that, if there is shared intentional activity, there is a “plural subject” of
that shared intentions).
133 Compare BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5, at 127 (“Should we say … that the group
agent of the shared intentional action is the subject of this intention? I think that this is not in
general true: in modest sociality there need not be a group subject who has the shared intention.
To talk of a subject who intends is to see that subject as center of a more or less coherent mental
web of, at the least, intentions and cognitions. The idea of a subject who intends X but has few
other intentional attitudes—who intends X in the absence of a mental web of that subject in
129
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into these discussions. For present purposes, to say that a collective as such φs
is just to say that its members φ as a shared cooperative activity. In turn, to say
that a collective intends to φ is just to say its members share an intention to φ as
a collective, i.e. that its members share a we-intention to φ. If one accepts that
there is such a thing as shared cooperative activity,134 one can and should accept
such minimal claims.
Questioning the applicability of the above model of shared agency to
large groups, Christopher Kutz argues that a shared intention to φ is too strong a
condition for a collective to φ in the case of, say, an orchestra. Kutz reasons
that, because the contribution of an individual member to the groups φing is
minimal, it makes no sense for her to intend to bring it about that the group
φs.135 As a weaker alternative, Kutz proposes that members need share an
intention to do their respective parts in φing for the collective to φ.136 Kutz’s
argument rests, at bottom, on disputable linguistic intuitions.137 Regardless,
Kutz’s “minimal contribution” concern, id., has little purchase as to legislation,
where each member’s “contribution,” i.e. her vote, is conditional on enough
other members so contributing.
Scott Shapiro contends similarly that a shared intention to φ is too strong
a condition for large groups because collective φing can occur even when some
members of a collective are “alienated,” i.e. even when some members do their
part despite being apathetic or even hostile to the project of φing. 138 As a
motivating example, Shapiro imagines two unaffiliated contractors each paid
$1,000 to do “what [the hiring party] tells him to do.”139 The hiring party tells
which this intention is located—seems a mistake.”) with Gilbert, What Is It?, supra note 132, at
14 (articulating “an account of shared intention as the intention of a plural subject” (first emphasis
added)).
134 As opposed to, say, mere “strategic interaction.” BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY, supra note 5,
at 92 (“A central thought of this discussion is that modest sociality, while consisting in
appropriate forms of interconnected planning agency, is not merely strategic interaction within
a context of common knowledge.”); see also Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden, Collective Intentions
and Team Agency, 66 J. PHIL. 109 (2007) (“A general problem for … accounts [of shared agency]
is how to differentiate collective intentions from the mutually-consistent individual intentions
that lie behind Nash equilibrium behaviour in games. “).
135 See CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 98 (2000)
(claiming that for “an individual cellist” to intend that “[the orchestra] play the Eroica” would be
for her to “take too grandiose a view of his or her role”).
136 Id. at 98-99.
137 See id. at 98 (claiming that it would “ring false” to attribute to an individual cellist the intention
that “we play the Eroica”).
138 Scott J. Shapiro, Massively Shared Agency, in RATIONAL AND SOCIAL AGENCY: ESSAYS ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL BRATMAN 257, 270 (Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe eds., 2014).
139 Id.
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one contractor to scrape the old paint off his house and the other to paint a new
coat on the scraped surface.140 Each does as told. From this, Shapiro infers that
the contractors “have intentionally painted the house together.”141 This, Shapiro
continues, despite the contractor instructed to scrape having been indifferent to
whether the other contractor applied the paint.142 Shapiro thus concludes,
contractors need not share an intention that “we” paint the house to paint the
house together intentionally.143
The problem with Shapiro’s example is that it conflates intentionally
brought about with brought about by intentional activity. In the example, each
contractor acts intentionally: The first contractor intentionally scrapes off the
old paint while the second contractor intentionally applies the new. What results
is a newly painted house. That result was reasonably foreseeable to each. But a
newly painted house was not brought about intentionally. At least not as far as
the first contractor is concerned. Rather, a newly painted house is the
foreseeable result of the two contractors’ strategic interaction.144
Despite this, there is some truth to Shapiro’s more general observation.
As explained above, it is plausible to attribute to an institutional group an
intention to φ despite some members of that group failing to intend that “we”
φ.145 One can imagine, in turn, scenarios in which an institutional group might
intend to φ despite some its members being “alienated” from the project of φing.
If, for example, most members of Congress were to vote for a gun bill with the
intention that “we” facilitate the purchase of assault rifles, it would be plausible
to attribute to Congress the intention to facilitate the purchase of assault rifles
even if a handful of members voted in favor begrudgingly to preserve their
National Rifle Association “grades.”146
Return now to traditional skepticism. Just from the above sketch of
shared agency, one can infer that neither preference nor intention aggregability
is a sufficient condition for there to be legislative intent. Consider the
motivating example of taking a walk. If you and I walk through the park side
by side but each is unaware of the other, each of us prefers walking to other
activities (assume for the sake of argument that our alternatives are the same).
Id.
Id.
142 Id. at 271 (“[The contractor] do[es]n’t care a wit about painting the house, only [about] getting
[his] money.”).
143 Id.
144 See supra note 134.
145 See supra note 126.
146 See How the N.R.A. Rates Lawmakers, THE NEW YORK TIMES (December 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/19/us/politics/nra.html.
140
141
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More to the point, each of us intends to walk through the park. As such, both
our preferences and our intentions are aggregable in the way the traditional
skeptic demands—aggregable in terms of the activity preferred or intended—
here, to walk through the park—without regard to whether that activity is
conceived as individual or joint.147 In this case, however, we do not intend to
walk through the park—even if you and I each do.
What of necessity? At one level, aggregability of legislator intention is,
by definition, a necessary condition of legislative intent on the account of shared
agency just sketched: if a collective intends to φ only if its members share an
intention that “we” φ, then, for all cases in which Congress intends to φ, its
members’ respective intentions to φ will be aggregable. In relation to traditional
skepticism, however, to say that shared agency entails intention aggregability is
misleading. Traditional skeptical arguments all have to do with the aggregability
of substantive policy preferences or intentions (e.g., an intention to curb carbon
emissions, a preference for expanding access to Medicaid, etc.).148 But, for
reasons touched on by Lawrence Solan, a legislature might, in an exercise of
shared agency, intend a substantive policy without all or even a majority of
legislators ever having had that policy in mind.149 Drawing on examples from
Gilbert, Solan observes that members of Congress might share an intention to
enact some policy X the details of which are to be determined by some specific
member (e.g., a bill sponsor, a committee chair, etc.), subset of members (e.g., a
committee), or, conceivably, some non-member third party (e.g., an executive
branch official, a lobbyist, etc.).150 In so doing, Congress would exercise shared
agency in much the same way as do you and I if each of us intends that we take

See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 244-45 (“[T]here is not a single legislative intent, but rather many
legislators’ intents. Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’ Legislator A may have voted for an
amendment that ultimately became part of the winning policy because he favored the ‘plain
meaning’ of the text. Legislator B, on the other hand, may have voted for it because he thought
(incorrectly as it turned out) that the amendment would undermine support for the final bill or
draw a presidential veto, thereby allowing the status quo ante to survive. Finally, Legislators C,
D, and E may have supported the amendment, disinterestedly, as a reasonable compromise
among competing interests.” (footnote omitted)).
148 See id. at 241-44 (constructing Arrowian dilemma around intransitivity of substantive policy
preferences).
149 See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005).
150 See id. at 447 (“While committees will often be at the center of this inquiry, this will not always
be the case. Sometimes, for example, the administration may propose legislation through
members of Congress. When that happens, the relevant committees may adopt statements from
the executive branch as reflecting the bill’s purpose. In other instances, the bill’s journey through
committees, floor debate and conference is complicated, with particular moments in the process
being crucial to passage of the bill.” (footnotes omitted)).
147
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a trip but I leave to you the choice of destination.151 In either case, members of
the collective share a “we” intention that commits them to something specific
without ever having to contemplate—let alone prefer or intend—that specific
thing.
D. New Skepticism
Congress does sometimes act as an “it.” When Congress takes an upor-down vote on a particular bill, for example, its members share a conditional
intention that “we” approve the bill in question if it receives the requisite
number of votes. For a member to cast her vote with this intention is just for
her to cast her vote intentionally.152 Likewise, when the House or the Senate
votes on a proposed rule of legislative procedure, its members share an intention
that “we” adopt the rule if sufficiently many members vote in favor. This much
is clear. Less clear is whether Congress, qua “it,” sometimes enacts a bill for
some purpose or intends that a textual provision have some specific meaning. This
Part suggests that not. Or at least not with any systematicity.
Again, on the account of shared agency just sketched, to say that
Congress as such intends to φ is just to say that (sufficiently many of) its
members share an intention that “we” φ. As the above discussion suggests, this
can come about in one of two ways. First, members can share a direct intention
that “we” φ. Second, members can share a direct intention that “we” θ that
commits them indirectly to an intention that “we” φ.
To illustrate, consider the recent dispute in King v. Burwell153 over the
phrase “Exchange established by the State,” as used in § 36B of the Internal
Revenue Code (“IRC”), enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”).154 Opponents of the ACA argued that, as used, “Exchange
established by the State” could only be read to refer just to healthcare exchanges
established by one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia.155 In response,
the Government argued that “the ACA’s structure and purpose all evince
Congress’s intent” that the phrase refer to “both state-run and federallyfacilitated Exchanges.”156 Per the above, one of two conditions must obtain for
See id. at 439-40.
Put another way, to cast one’s vote without this intention would be to evince a basic
misunderstanding of voting procedure.
153 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
154 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
155 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015).
156 King v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 1028988 (C.A.4), 13 (quoting Halbig v. Sebelius, No. CV 13-0623
(PLF), 2014 WL 129023, at *17 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014) rev’d and remanded sub nom. Halbig v.
151
152
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the Government’s claim to have been true: 1) when enacting the ACA, members
of Congress shared a direct intention that, by “Exchange established by the
State,” “we” mean exchanges established by the states or the federal
government; or 2) members shared some other direct intention (e.g., an
intention that the ACA be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
assumptions underlying the corresponding CBO score157) that committed them
indirectly to this reading.
Appeal to direct intention is, as a rule, hopeless for purposes of
substantiating an attribution of legislative intent. As an empirical matter,
member of Congress “don’t read text,”158 let alone form communicative
intentions as to (or understandings of159) specific textual provisions. Further,
because members act at the behest of different constituencies, it is rare for
members to agree160 upon reasons for action (outside of preambles, at least161).
This leaves appeal to indirect commitment. Various scholars have
pursued this approach in recent years. For the most part, these are the same
scholars who have urged courts, when engaging in interpretation, to pay greater
attention to “how Congress really works.”162 Such scholars appeal to indirect
commitments of one of two sorts. The first is commitments resulting from
members’ acceptance of formal norms. The second is commitments resulting
from members’ adherence to informal norms. For the reasons below, both
approaches fail.
1. Formal Norms
On occasion, Congress plausibly commits itself indirectly to a
communicative intention by adopting some formal norm such as an enacted
procedural rule. For example, as Victoria Nourse observes, both the House and
the Senate have a rule that prohibits conference committees from altering of the
Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018,
2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014)).
157 See Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 782.
158 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 972.
159 At least some participants in the drafting process seem to understand statutory meaning as
‘objective,’ i.e. as determined apart from the subjective intentions of drafters. See, e.g., Jarrod
Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 807, 831 (2014) (observing that legislative counsel “view their role as ensuring [textual]
clarity”).
160 In the sense of coordinate.
161 See infra notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
162 Nourse, supra note 1, at 143; accord Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 909;
KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 8.
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text of a bill where the two chambers have agreed to the same language.163 From
this procedural rule, Nourse rightly infers that, where post-conference language
(e.g., “utilized”) differs from agreed upon pre-conference language (e.g.,
“established”), Congress is committed—where plausible164—to the intention
that the former communicate something substantially similar to that that was
communicated by the latter.165 And, as Nourse appears to recognize, this
commitment to pre-/post-conference consistency will entail a commitment to
a discernable communicative intention if the intention expressed by preconference language is itself discernable (e.g., where one can tell what Congress
meant—or at least did not mean166—with that language).167
Nourse goes on to suggest that attention to the formal norms of
legislative procedure renders both unmysterious and unproblematic the search
for legislative intent. None of Nourse’s other examples, however, support that
generalization. Nourse argues, for instance, that various procedural rules (e.g.,
cloture rules) dictate which stages of the legislative process (e.g., pre-filibuster
compromise) are “important point[s] of textual decision.”168 From this, Nourse
infers that the legislative history most proximate to some such decision (e.g., the
inclusion of specific language) will, other things equal, shed the most light on
legislative intent as it pertains to that decision.169 Legislative history consists just
of non-binding statements or reports prepared by (or on behalf of) some
individual member or subset of members. By assuming uncritically that
legislative history is probative of legislative intent, Nourse thus shifts without
remark from intent qua shared indirect commitment to intent qua what was likely in the
See Nourse, supra note 1, at 94 & n.97 (“Conference committees cannot—repeat, cannot—
change the text of a bill where both houses have agreed to the same language.” (citing Rules of
the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 111-157, R. XXII (9), at 37 (2011); Standing Rules
of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 112-1, R. XXVIII (2a), at 52 (2011))).
164 In cases where the rule was plainly violated, one cannot plausibly attribute to Congress such
an intention.
165 See id. at 96 (“A faithful member of Congress would assume that, when both houses pass the
same language, any added language must be read as making no substantive change in the bill.”).
166 If, for example, pre-conference language plainly precluded a particular reading, one could
infer that Congress did not intend that reading post-conference. This would be true regardless
of whether pre-conference language was in some other way unclear.
167 See id. (“If the ambiguity is created in conference committee, … then the court may resolve
the ambiguity by conforming to Congress’s own rules.” (emphasis added)).
168 Id. at 98. Here, Nourse builds upon prior work in positive political science. See McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3 (1994) (purporting to “identify aspects of the legislative history that are more reliably
informative about the intent of the majority coalition that enacted a statute” through the
identification of “veto gates”); McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 99 (same).
169 See Nourse, supra note 1, at 110 (“[T]he best legislative history is the history most proximate
to text, rather than a particular type of report or statement ….”).
163
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head of a member at the time of decision to the extent she was paying attention.170 There is,
of course, no guarantee (and strong reason to doubt) that all or a majority of
members are paying attention at the time of any given decision.171 Therefore,
absent some unmentioned shared informal commitment to, say, treating as
authoritative the view of some individual member or set of members, Nourse
offers no reason to share her confidence that attention to cloture rules will reveal
shared intentions. Each of Nourse’s additional arguments (e.g., that statements
by legislative “winners” are more probative than statements by “losers”172)
suffers from this defect.
Congress also sometimes commits itself to communicative intentions
via statute. The Dictionary Act in Title 1 of the United States Code, for example,
contains various rules of construction that inform “the meaning of any Act of
Congress.”173 Because it has committed itself to these rules, one can attribute
to Congress, other things equal,174 the intention to “include the future as well as
the present” where it has used the present tense .175 So too, where it has used
the term “person,” one can attribute to Congress the intention to refer to
“include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies,
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”176 In addition to the
Dictionary Act, Congress makes liberal use of definitions sections within
specific statutes. Hence, when interpreting Title 18, one can attribute to
Congress, where it uses the term “United States” in a “territorial sense,” the
intention to refer to “all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone.”177 Last, in terms of
broader practical intentions, Congress does sometimes commit itself to such
intentions via preamble. When interpreting some provision of the Animal
Welfare Act, for instance, one can attribute to Congress the background intent
of “[e]nsur[ing] that animals intended for use in research facilities … are
provided humane care and treatment.”178

In other words, to the extent that committee reports et al. are non-binding, such sources are,
at best, probative of how a given member understood the corresponding text as a historical
matter.
171 See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
172 Nourse, supra note 1, at 118-19.
173 1 U.S.C. § 1.
174 The Dictionary Act’s rules of construction are framed as default rules, i.e. as rules that apply
“unless the context indicates otherwise.” Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 18 U.S.C. § 5.
178 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
170
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Unfortunately, definitions sections179 and preambles only get one so far.
Setting aside the old problem that one must interpret definitions sections and
preambles,180 such provisions plainly do not—and could not plausibly181—
ground the array of intent attributions described in Part I.
In sum, appeal to formal norms adopted by Congress fails as a general
method for substantiating attributions of legislative intent.
2. Informal Norms
Appeal to informal legislative norms fares no better. First, judicial
recognition of a non-obvious legislative norms would plausibly conflict with fair
notice. Particularly so with the informal norms alleged. Second, recent
empirical studies of the legislative drafting process support skepticism about
intent attributable to Congress via informal norm.
What is an informal legislative norm? For present purposes, an informal
norm is just a recognized norm with no formal basis.182 Consider, for example,
the norm in soccer that a player kick the ball out of bounds if a player from the
opposing team is injured. This norm appears nowhere in the FIFA rulebook
but is widely recognized by both players and fans. It is, therefore, an informal
norm of the sport.183 An informal legislative norm, in turn, is just a norm
recognized but not formally adopted by Congress as such. The norm that a
home senator retains veto power over a judicial nominee, for example, has no

In effect, the Dictionary Act is a definitions section for the entire United States Code.
Cf. Fallon, Three Symmetries, supra note 85, at 711 (observing that “if a theory … tried to
incorporate within itself rules for its own application, then someone could always demand to
see the principles specifying how those prescriptions should in turn be interpreted”); LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 217 (G.E.M. Anscombe ed., 1991)
(“‘How am I able to obey a rule?’—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the
justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I
have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what
I do.’”).
181 Congress could not, for instance, simply define away the range of conceivable Travis case.
182 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181 (2013)
(contrasting informal “conventions” with “formal legal rules”).
183 See Nate Scott, Italian Soccer Game Has Heartwarming Display of Sportsmanship, USA TODAY
SPORTS (March 20, 2014), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2014/03/soccer-game-italian-serie-dsportmanship (“A player for [Team A] was injured, so [Team B] kicked the ball out of bounds
to allow him to get treatment. As is customary in soccer, [Team A] then threw the ball in and
gave the ball back to [Team B]’s goalkeeper.”).
179
180
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basis in statute or formal procedural rule. It is, nonetheless, recognized by
members as binding.184
Various accounts of legislative intent are built upon appeal to informal
legislative norms. Such accounts claim that members of Congress share
intentions to delegate the task of authoring legislation. In turn, members are
alleged to be committed, albeit informally, to regarding the intentions of their
delegates as authoritative. Solan, for example, claims that Congress delegates to
“subplanners” the task of giving “content” to particular bills.185 Often but not
always the subplanners in question are originating congressional committees. 186
According to Solan, members of Congress share a “general recognition that those
who ushered [a] bill through the process did so with particular [intentions] that
deserve to be honored.”187 From this, Solan infers, among other things, that
“the historical record of a committee … that developed the details of a statute
is typically useful evidence of that subgroup’s, and thus the entire group’s, intent.”188
Similarly, Judge Katzmann reasons that courts should consider legislative history
because so doing “can aid the judge in understanding how the legislation’s
congressional proponents wanted the statute to work, what problems they sought to
address, what purposes they sought to achieve, and what methods they
employed to secure those purposes.”189 Judge Katzmann goes on to assert that
“[w]hen Congress passes a law, it can be said to incorporate the materials that it
or at least the law’s principal sponsors (and others who worked to secure enactment)
deem useful in interpreting the law.”190 Judge Katzmann infers this informal
commitment to incorporation from the “substantial control” over the legislative
process afforded to “particular legislators,” including “committee chairs, floor
managers, and party leaders.”191 Gluck and Bressman likewise argue that that
“faithful-agent judges” should use legislative history to discern the intentions of
“legislative drafters,” i.e. those members and staffers most responsible for
putting together a particular bill.192 Gluck and Bressman go on to advocate
various interpretive rules (e.g., that a statute be interpreted in accordance with
the assumptions underlying the corresponding CBO score, that a statute drafted

See MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32013, THE HISTORY OF THE
BLUE SLIP IN THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 1917-PRESENT (2003).
185 Solan, supra note 149, at 448-49.
186 See id. at 447.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 35.
190 Id. at 48; see also id. at 38 (characterizing committee reports and conference committee reports
as “authoritative materials”).
191 Id. at 48-49.
192 E.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 959.
184
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by a committee be construed to preserve that committee’s jurisdiction193)
supposed to approximate the intentions of those “doing the drafting.”194 Gluck
and Bressman equate without argument the intentions of drafters and those of
Congress as such.
The above accounts give rise to two concerns.195 First, greater attention
to “how Congress really works” supports skepticism about legislative intent via
delegation. Assume arguendo that Congress intends to delegate authorship to
“drafters.” In the simple case, a committee drafts a bill. Both chambers then
adopt that bill without amendment. Here, whatever intentions are attributable
to the committee are attributable to Congress as such. But how to determine
what intentions are attributable to the committee? Beyond looking at the
statutory text, the traditional answer is: read the committee report.196 That
answer is difficult to square, however, with survey responses showing
differences of opinion amongst drafters as to whether such reports are

See Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 781, 782.
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 946; see also id. at 989(“Courts rather easily might
implement many of our respondents’ insights related to the different types of legislative history,
for example: distinguish between omnibus and appropriations legislative history; entrench the
inconsistently applied doctrine that committee reports are the most reliable history; pay more
attention to markups; and place more weight on scripted colloquies or other documents issued
jointly by committee leaders of opposing parties.”).
195 In addition to the concerns voiced here, delegation-based accounts of legislative intent have
been subject to non-delegation critique. As mentioned above, Article I, § 1 vests all legislative
power in Congress as such. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. According to Justice
Scalia, “[i]t has always been assumed that these powers are nondelegable—or, as John Locke
put it, that legislative power consists of the power ‘to make laws, … not to make legislators.’”
Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (R. Cox ed.1982)).
Sharpening the critique, John Manning argues that “legislative self-delegation poses a particularly
acute danger to [the Article I, § 7 requirements of] bicameralism and presentment and is
unconstitutional per se.” John F. Manning, Textualsim as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 676 (1997) [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation] (emphasis added). Manning reasons
that when a court “gives authoritative weight to,” say, “a committee’s subjective understanding
of statutory meaning (announced outside the statutory text), it empowers Congress to specify
statutory details—without the structurally-mandated cost of getting two Houses of Congress
and the President to approve them.” Id. at 707.
This non-delegation critique, however, rests on the premise that Congress votes on
legislative text, not ‘drafter’s’ understanding thereof. But, to the extent that ‘drafter’s
understanding’ is just something like speaker meaning, that contrast is difficult to sustain for the
reasons articulated in Part I.
196 See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“[T]he authoritative source for finding
the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation.’” (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))).
193
194
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reliable.197 So too with the concession by drafters in those same surveys that
committee reports are used sometimes “to include ‘something we couldn’t get
in the statute’ in order ‘to make key stakeholders happy.’”198 Further, because
the majority party drafts the report, “[t]his puts [it] in a position to be able to
use [its] control of legislative history to sneak in [its] preferred interpretation
even if it goes against the bargains that [it] made with the minority party to
achieve passage.”199
Consider next a more complex (and more realistic) case. Some
committee drafts a bill. Prior to adoption, various amendments are made on the
floor. Whose intentions are attributable to Congress here? The naïve response
is that the committee’s intentions are attributable as to the un-amended portions
of the bill and that the intentions of amendment authors are attributable as to
the portions amended.200 This is too quick. Because a bill is read as a whole,
amended portions shape one’s reading of un-amended portions and vice
versa.201 For this reason, one must, to make sense of a whole bill, attribute a
coherent set of practical and communicative intentions to its author(s). But
how? Committee member and amendment authors need not coordinate

Perhaps unsurprisingly, drafters responsible for committee reports regard those reports more
highly than those not. Compare Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 977-78 (reporting
that most committee staffers regard committee reports as either “very reliable” or “reliable”)
with Shobe, supra note 159, at 848 (reporting that legislative counsel—responsible for statutory
text but not legislative history—regard committee staffers as having difficulty articulating policy
goals clearly); see also Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 978 (recognizing “potential
bias” of committee staffers in favor of committee work product).
198 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 973; see also Schobe, supra note 159, at 870; Victoria
F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607 (2002) (“As one staffer put it: ‘[T]o maintain agreement, people often
prefer to leave language ambiguous and put things in legislative history.’”).
199 Schobe, supra note 159, at 870. As Schobe goes on to explain, “While [the majority party’s]
duplicity could cost them credibility, it will often not be revealed until many years later—if at
all—when the case is litigated.” Id. Gluck and Bressman anticipate this concern, emphasizing
that committee reports and other group-produced legislative “often convey bipartisan,
multimember understandings. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 978. For the
reasons explained below, however, even in cases where a committee report reflects a bipartisan
consensus among committee members, the question remains how to integrate that consensus with
the attitudes of non-committee members.
200 Because the amendments occur after committee, the committee need not form intentions as
to their purpose or meaning. Nor is there an apparent reason to privilege committee intentions
formed after a bill reaches the floor.
201 By analogy, suppose a studio contracts with A to write a screenplay. Dissatisfied, the studio
then contracts with B to rewrite the ending. B’s new ending will influence the audience’s
interpretation of early scenes despite her having left those scenes unaltered. Likewise, the early
scenes will influence the audience’s interpretation of the new ending.
197

38

HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS

8/1/2016 1:59 PM

intentions. And how to reconcile conflicting, uncoordinated intentions
(whether policy or communicative) is unclear.202
Return now to the initial assumption that members share an intention
to delegate. What is clear is that members share an intention to delegate to other
members and staffers the drafting of proposed legislation, i.e. the putting of finger
to keyboard. Also clear is that members depend on other members and staffers
for information about what proposed legislation does. Less clear is whether
members share an intention to delegate to other members or staffers authorship
of proposed legislation in the sense of authoritative understanding thereof. For
example, in the course of arguing against a “text-focused approach” to
interpretation,203 Gluck and Bressman claim that “[i]t is not uncommon to hear
that a group of elected officials has reached a ‘deal’ before pen is put to paper.”204
As evidence, Gluck and Bressman cite a complaint by Senator Mike Lee (R-UT)
that “a gun bill was being debated even as ‘not a single senator ha[d] been
provided the legislative language.’”205 Senator Lee’s complaint only makes sense,
of course, if proposed legislation consists of “legislative language” as opposed
to some extra-textual “deal.” More to the point, it only makes sense if he regards
himself as free to interpret that “language” himself. Again, this is of a piece with
members making floor statements that conflict with committee reports and the
like.
Taken together, the above provides ample reason for skepticism about
intent via delegation. It is doubtful that members share an intention to delegate
authorship. And, even if Congress so intends, the intentions of delegates are
unknowable or unformed.
In the above respects, Congress thus contrasts sharply with a typical
corporation. Various scholars reason that attributing intentions to Congress is
Add to this the practical complication that the legislative history generated with respect to
floor amendments is alleged to be poor.
203 In particular, an approach to interpretation that considers text at a “granular” level. Gluck
& Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 743 (“This is not to say that members and staff do not
care about text …. Rather, it is to say that micro-level legal disputes over what is often a single
word in a lengthy statute may be improperly focused ….”); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect
Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress's Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 62, 64 (2015) [hereinafter Gluck, Imperfect Statutes] (arguing that “[w]hereas the Court’s
recent statutory interpretation jurisprudence has been marked by a targeted focus on a
few contested words, King [v. Burwell] responds by looking at the full picture, at
Congress’s ‘plan’”).
204 Id. at 740.
205 Jennifer Bendery, Gun Bill Vote: Senate Overcomes GOP Filibuster Effort to Begin Debate,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/11/gun-billvote_n_3061275.html.
202
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unproblematic because we freely attribute intentions to corporations and other
multi-member bodies.206 In the case of corporations, intent attribution is often
unproblematic because corporations are, generally speaking, hierarchical
organizations with clear allocations of decisionmaking authority. Because, for
example, a corporation’s general counsel has decisionmaking authority with
respect to the corporation’s legal strategy, the general counsel’s intentions with
respect to legal strategy are, as a rule, attributable to the corporation as a
whole.207 In this way, the typical corporation is quite unlike Congress. Contrary
to the suggestion of many, a bill’s primary sponsors do not appear to enjoy the
sort of widely recognized delegation of authority as does a general counsel.
Second, judicial recognition of non-obvious informal legislative norms
would plausibly conflict with fair notice. As a constitutional matter, “laws which
regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or
required.”208 This means, at a minimum, that information necessary to
understanding a law must be publicly available209 and that guidance concerning
the content of the law must not be misleading.210 As a normative matter, notice
is required by “[e]lementary notions of fairness.”211 It is also “recognized as an
essential element of the rule of law.”212 Quite plausibly, “blame and punishment
See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 1, at 86 (“If lawyers find no difficulty in understanding the
complexities of other collective entities, such as corporations or administrative agencies, one
wonders why it is too difficult to understand Congress.”); BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY
WORK, supra note 114, at 99 (“It is not conceptually difficult, however, to attribute a purpose to
a corporate body such as Congress. Corporations, companies, partnerships, ... and legislatures
engage in intentional activities ....”).
207 Delegation also explains attributions of intent to judicial opinions of multimember courts.
See Nourse, supra note 1, at 74 (“[Lawyers] do not charge the multimember Supreme Court with
having no ‘intent’ and, from this premise, dismiss judicial opinions as if the Court had made no
decision.”). Because courts delegate authorship of an opinion to a particular judge or justice in
most cases, the intentions of the authoring judge or justice are attributable to the court as a
whole.
208 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
209 See Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 470 (2005) (“There is a
consensus, for instance, that the people subject to a statute should have fair notice of the law’s
requirements; that is why even intentionalists restrict themselves to publicly available materials
when trying to discern what the enacting legislature meant.” (emphasis added)).
210 See Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2312-14, 2318 (holding that broadcasters lacked fair notice that
prohibition against broadcast of “obscene, indecent, or profane language” applied to “fleeting”
expletives where agency policy at time of broadcast indicated that prohibition applied only
“repeated” expletives).
211 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice … of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment ....”).
212 Note, Textualism As Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 543 (2009); accord Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions,
206
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presuppose that [an] agent had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing.”213 So too
a rule of law, which ensures an “opportunity to know what the law is and to
conform [one’s] conduct accordingly.”214
Recognition of certain informal norms is plainly consistent with fair
notice. Some such norms are obvious. The norm that legislation be written in
English, for example, has no formal basis but is widely recognized by members
of Congress and by interpreters, both professional and lay.215 Because the norms
is so obvious, one would be hard-pressed to say that a “person of ordinary
intelligence”216 lacks notice of its operation.217 Contrast this, however, with the
alleged norm that a statute is to be interpreted in accordance with the
understanding of its principal sponsors. Members routinely make floor
statement that “disavow[] the committee’s or sponsor’s interpretation.”218 In so
doing, those members implicitly repudiate the alleged delegatory norm. Assume
for the moment these statements are subterfuge. Even still, it would be
one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939))).
213 David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin, Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility, in 1 OXFORD
STUDIES IN AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY 284, 285 (David Shoemaker ed., 2013) (emphasis
added).
214 Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994); accord Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory
of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 471 (1982) (“The rule of law … is a defeasible
entitlement of persons to have their behavior governed by rules publicly fixed in advance.”).
215 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of
Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 101 n.9 (2003) (“[T]extualists assume that …
statutes are written in English. But no text by itself declares the language in which it is written.
Rather, the context—English-speaking authors writing to direct an English-speaking
audience—shows that English was the language intended.” (citations omitted)).
216 Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2317 (“A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the
statute or regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice of what is prohibited.’” (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)));
accord Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[B]ecause we assume that man is
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly.”).
217 The same can probably be said of the various “linguistic” canons that interpreting courts
apply. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS __ (2012) (discussing what the authors refer to as “semantic” and “syntactic”
canons). Because those canons are just approximations of the usage norms of ordinary English,
the general norm that statutes in English plausibly entails the more specific norm that, for
example, those same statutes conform to the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Gluck
and Bressman observe that drafters report varying degrees of compliance with the linguistic
canons. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 932. Because such canons are best
understood as rules of thumb, as opposed to rigid prescriptions, such varied compliance is
compatible with the thesis that statutes conform to those canons generally.
218 Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 195, at 721 & n.207 (collecting cases).
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troubling to say that citizens have notice of a norm the existence of which
officials deny.219 Add to this the recent finding that a sponsor’s understanding
is often informed by “‘inside information’ that may be unknowable to courts or
litigants,”220 and the fair notice concern becomes greater still.221
For the above reasons, appeal to informal norms also fails as a method
for substantiating attributions of legislative intent.
III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS FICTION, OR THE IRRELEVANCE OF
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
So claims about legislative intent are systematically false if taken literally.
This Part argues that such claims are, therefore, best understood as involving a
useful fiction. The fiction this Part posits is that legislation is written by a generic
author. So understood, a claim about legislative intent is apt if and only if one
would make that claim about a generic author on the basis of her having written
the legislation at issue in the context of enactment.
A. Fictionalism
Fictionalism about a particular discourse is the thesis that claims within
that discourse are best understood not as aiming at the literal truth but rather as
involving a useful fiction.222 When children play cops and robbers, for example,
utterances such as “Mary has a gun!” or “The money is in the vault!” involve an
obvious pretense. Hence it being unembarrassing that Mary carries a twig, not
a firearm. Within such a discourse, utterances are still apt or inapt;223 thus it

Cf. id. at 720 (expressing concern that, “because the Court has stated that it will treat
committee reports and sponsor’s statements as more ‘authoritative’ than ordinary floor
statements, individual legislators can even take to the floor and make statements disavowing the
committee’s or sponsor’s interpretation, without precluding judicial reliance on the history
produced by the more ‘authoritative’ legislative actors” (footnotes omitted)).
220 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 985.
221 Cf. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, it is not unlike the practice of Caligula, who
reportedly ‘wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the
more effectually to ensnare the people.’” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 (1765))).
222 See Roth, supra note 124.
223 In other words, to say that a discourse involves a useful fiction is not to say that, within that
discourse, anything goes.
219
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mattering whether Mary is in possession of the twig. It is just that aptness is
determined by pretense in combination with facts on the ground.224
Fictionalism is often motivated by the concern that a discourse would
suffer from a systematic defect if claims within it aimed at literal truth.225 That
concern might be metaphysical or epistemological. In the case of cops and
robbers, the concern is metaphysical. Within the discourse, children appear to
refer to objects that do not exist (e.g., money, vaults, guns). As such, claims
within the discourse would be systematically false if attempts at literal truth.
Contrast this with children discussing a plan to unearth buried treasure in the
backyard. Here, if taken literally, claims within the discourse would be
systematically unwarranted even if true (while the yard might contain buried
treasure, the children have no way of knowing226). In each case, appeal to pretense
explains away the would-be defect.227
Fictionalism can be hermeneutic or revolutionary.228
Hermeneutic
fictionalism is the thesis that a discourse involves a pretense.229 Revolutionary
fictionalism is the thesis that it should.230 With cops and robbers, hermeneutic
fictionalism is plainly true. Children do not, for instance, mistake a twig for a
gun once the game has come to an end. Contrast this, however, with a child’s
talk about her imaginary friend. Here, it might be unclear whether the child
regards her friend as imaginary. If not, hermeneutic fictionalism as to her talk
is false. Revolutionary fictionalism, however, is probably true. The child can
See, e.g., Stephen Yablo, Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?, 72 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 229,
247 (1998) (offering a pretense-based account of truth within a fiction); Kendall Walton,
Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe, 1 EURO. J. PHIL. 39, 46 (1993) (same).
225 See Jason Stanley, Hermeneutic Fictionalism, in MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME
XXV: FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 36 (Peter A. French & Howard Wettstein eds., 2001) (“On a
fictionalist view, engaging in discourse that involves apparent reference to a realm of
problematic entities is best viewed as engaging in a pretense.”).
226 See, e.g., JOHN HAWTHORNE, KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES 23 (2004) (“The practice of
assertion is constituted by the rule/requirement that one assert something only if one knows
it.”); TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 243 (2000) (defending the
“knowledge rule,” i.e. the rule that “[o]ne must: assert p only if one knows p”). While not all
philosophers accept the knowledge norm of assertion, it is common ground that the norm(s) of
assertion relate to epistemic access to the proposition asserted. See, e.g., Jennifer Lackey, Norms
of Assertion, 41 NOÛS 594 (2007) (defending the “reasonable to believe” norm of assertion).
227 In other words, fictionalism is a charitable reconstruction of an otherwise defective discourse.
228 JOHN P. BURGESS & GIDEON ROSEN, A SUBJECT WITH NO OBJECT: STRATEGIES FOR
NOMINALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF MATHEMATICS 6 (1999) (observing distinction).
229 Id. (“On what may be called the hermeneutic conception, the claim is … , ‘All anyone really
means—all the words really mean—is . . .’”).
230 Id. (“On what may be called the revolutionary conception, the goal is reconstruction or
revision.”).
224
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and should231 continue her friendship (and, in turn, her talk about that friendship)
as a game of make-believe.232
B. Fictionalism About Legislative Intent
Fictionalism about legislative intent is the thesis that claims about intent
are best understood as involving a pretense. More specifically, fictionalism is
the thesis that such claims involve the pretense that legislation is written by some
author or other. As explained in Part I, intent attribution is necessary if
legislation is to be an effective means of communication. For that reason,
simply abandoning discourse about legislative intent is not a serious option. As
explained in Part II, the primary motivation for fictionalism is the metaphysical
concern that legislation has no author.233 If legislation has no author, then claims
about legislative intent are systematically false if taken literally. Appeal to the
pretense of a generic author explains away this defect.234 Understood as
involving this pretense, a claim about legislative intent is apt if and only if one
would make that claim about a generic author on the basis of her having written
the legislation at issue in the context of enactment.
Why a generic author? Intent claims are made in relation to a context of
enactment. A context of enactment consists of information from which one
can draw inferences about an author about whom one knows nothing otherwise.
Just from the fact that one is interpreting a federal statute, for example, one can
infer that its author has written legislation as opposed to satire. Likewise, one
can infer that the statute’s author has written in English, given the obvious
convention of so doing.235 More generally, a context of enactment provides
enough information to make sense of what an author is doing. For this reason,
appeal to the pretense of a generic author is enough to make sense of discourse
about legislative intent. Appeal to the pretense of, say, a “reasonable legislator”
See, e.g., Paige E. Davis, Elizabeth Meinsb, & Charles Fernyhough, Individual Differences in
Children’s Private Speech: The Role of Imaginary Companions, 116 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL.
561 (2013) (finding that children who had imaginary companions were more likely to engage in
covert private speech).
232 Discourse about a child’s imaginary friend thus contrasts with discourse about ghosts or
phlogiston, which one probably does best to abandon.
233 A secondary motivation for fictionalism about legislative intent is the epistemological concern
that, even if legislation has an author, its author’s intentions are unknowable. See supra notes
196-199 and accompanying text. If an author’s intentions are unknowable, then claims about
legislative intent are systematically unwarranted if aimed at literal truth. See supra note 226.
234 Appeal to this pretense also explains away the abovementioned epistemological defect
because it renders legislative intent knowable by definition, i.e. on a fictionalist approach
legislative intent just is what one would have reason to believe it to be.
235 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
231
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is, for this reason, unnecessary.236 One can thus avoid the political philosophical
judgments such an appeal might entail.237
So understood, fictionalism about intent is a refinement of “objectified
intent,” as invoked by some textualists. According to Manning, “[l]egislative
intent, to the extent textualists invoke it, is a framework of analysis designed to
satisfy the minimum conditions for meaningful communication by a multimember body without actual intentions to judges, administrators, and the public,
who all form a community of shared conventions for decoding language in
context.”238 As Manning goes on to explain, “textualists focus on ‘objectified
intent,’” i.e. “the import that a reasonable person conversant with applicable
social and linguistic conventions would attach to the enacted words.”239 As
discussed above, textualists sometimes unreasonably restrict context to so-called
“semantic context.”240 And, as explained below, textualists sometimes
misidentify the epistemic position(s) that determine what information context
E.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 895 (2003) (observing that “[p]urposivism usually attributes goals or aims by envisioning
reasonable legislators acting reasonably”); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(recommending that courts interpret statutes under the presumption that the legislature is “made
of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”).
237 Given a minimalist gloss, the ‘reasonable legislator’ collapses into the generic author. A
generic author is presumptively reasonable in the sense that a listener assumes, other things
equal, that a speaker has complied with the operative conversational norms. See Kent Bach,
Speech Acts and Pragmatics, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 155
(Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley eds., 2006) (“The listener presumes that the speaker is being
cooperative and is speaking truthfully, informatively, relevantly, perspicuously, and otherwise
appropriately. If an utterance superficially appears not to conform to this presumption, the
listener looks for a way of taking the utterance so that it does conform.”). And, because she is
the author of legislation, a generic author is a legislator just in that sense. Given a non-minimalist
gloss, however, the ‘reasonable legislator’ can diverge from the generic author in one of two
ways. First, one can apply to the ‘reasonable legislator’ a stronger presumption of reasonableness
than would one to a run-of-the-mill interlocutor (e.g., a super-strong presumption against
misstatement, see United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he sine qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine, it seems to me, is that the
meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise we
might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.” (emphasis added))).
See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 15, at 604 (“When ordinary speakers leave crucial
contingencies unaddressed, when they unwittingly undertake inconsistent commitments, or
when what they advocate transparently defeats the goals of their advocacy, we do not pretend
that Beneficient Providence has filled every gap, removed every contradiction, and rationalized
every linguistic performance.”). Second, one might build in to the idea a philosophically robust
conception of ‘legislator’ (e.g., a delegate or a trustee conception).
238 Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 11,. at 434.
239 Id. at 424.
240 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
236
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includes.241 Still, the pretense of a generic author both captures and renders
more precise the basic textualist insight that legislative intent is just the intent
that one would attribute to the author of legislation as such.
Fictionalism is thus similar to but importantly different from the sort of
minimalism about legislative intent defended by Joseph Raz and others. Raz
argues that, when a legislator votes on some text, she does so with the minimal—
and presumably shared—intention that the text be read in accordance with “the
[interpretive] conventions prevailing at the time.”242 Jeremey Waldron likewise
assures that a legislator casts her vote “on the assumption that—to put it
crudely—what the words mean to him is identical to what they will mean to
those to whom they are addressed (in the event that the provision is passed).”243
Understood in one way, such claims are uncontroversial but uninformative: To
say that a member intends a text to be read in accordance with “prevailing”
conventions is plausibly just to say that the member regards the conventions she
intends as prevailing. Likewise, to say that a member assumes a text will mean
to its audience what it means to her is plausibly just to say that the member
understands her interpretation as correct. In other words, Raz and Waldron
read one way claim just that a text’s meaning is assumed by all parties to be
objective. Read another, more ambitious way, however, such claims amount to an
endorsement of factionalism—or, to be more precise, a realist functional
equivalent: On this understanding, to read a text in accordance with “prevailing”
conventions is to attach to it the “import” that “a reasonable person conversant
with applicable social and linguistic” norms would, i.e. as expressing
“objectified” intent.244 For the reasons articulated above, to so intend is to
intend that a text be read as if written by a generic author.
Richard Ekins argues similarly that a reasonable legislator intends that a
legislative text have “the meaning that a reasonable sole legislator who attends
to the context … would be likely to intend to convey in uttering” those words.245
Ekins observes rightly that “meaning” attribution of the sort he imagines
involves attribution of both linguistic and practical intentions.246 The
See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
RAZ, supra note 7, at 286.
243 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 129 (1999); see also id. (“That such
assumptions pervade the legislative process shows how much law depends on language, on the
shared conventions that constitute a language, and on the reciprocity of intentions that
conventions comprise.”).
244 Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 11, at 424.
245 RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 236 (2012).
246 See id. at 235-36 (“It is possible for drafters to convey more than the semantic content of the
bill alone because legislators have good reason to understand proposals for action to be the
choice that a rational legislator would be likely to make in enacting this text.”).
241
242
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“reasonable sole legislator” that Ekins posits is plausibly more robust and,
hence, more contestable than the generic author posited here.247 Still, Ekins
comes close to defending a functional equivalent to fictionalism as a thesis about
actual shared legislator intention.
The problem with a generic author conception of legislative intent as a
thesis about actual legislator intention is that such a thesis is difficult to square
with the express position of some but not all legislators that interpreters owe
special attention to legislative history, i.e. that interpreters should privilege
legislators’ epistemic position.248 More plausible is that there just is no legislator
consensus as to which interpretive norms should apply.249 Ekins might be right
that a reasonable legislator would intend that a statute be read as if written by a
generic author.250 The trouble is that, as an empirical matter, numerous actual
legislators appear highly unreasonable.
Fictionalism also shares similarities with so-called “original public
meaning” originalism in constitutional interpretation.251 As characterized by
Lawrence Solum, “[t]he original-meaning version of originalism emphasizes the
meaning that the Constitution (or its amendments) would have had to the
relevant audience at the time of its adoptions.” 252 More precisely, originalpublic-meaning originalists inquire into the “conventional” meaning of
constitutional language “in context” at the time of adoption and ratification.253
Original-public-meaning originalism thus contrasts with so-called “original
See, e.g., id. at 128 (“The sole legislator has a duty to oversee the content of the law and to act
to change the law when this serves the common good.”); id. at 220 (“[P]roposals for action that
are fit to be chosen by a reasonable sole legislator [are] coherent, reasoned plans to change the
law.”); see also supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
248 See KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 36 (observing that members of both parties “have
consistently supported judicial resort to legislative history”).
249 See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
250 See EKINS, supra, at 235-36; see also RAZ, supra note 7, at 286 (arguing that a legislator must
intend that a legislative text be read in accordance with prevailing conventions because to intend
otherwise would be futile and so irrational); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Illinois
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), at 5, http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1120244
[hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism] (arguing that “under normal conditions successful
constitutional communication requires reliance by the drafters, ratifiers, and interpreters on the
original public meaning of the words and phrases”).
251 E.g., Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2; Steven G.
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
252 Id. at 51; see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 923, 926 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, Heller and Originalism] (characterizing “original public
meaning originalism” as “the view that the original meaning of a constitutional provision is the
conventional semantic meaning that the words and phrases had at the time the provision was
framed and ratified”).
253 Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2.
247
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intention” originalism,254 which has as its object of inquiry the actual, historical
intentions of the enactors of the Constitution.255 Much like textualists,256
original-public-meaning originalists tend to underestimate the role of pragmatics
in communication.257 For that reason, original-public-meaning originalists rely
upon the notion of “conventional” meaning to a greater extent than is, perhaps,
warranted.258 Still, much like fictionalism, original-public-meaning originalism
focuses quite plausibly on the communicative intentions one would attribute to
the author of the Constitution as such.259 This despite the reluctance of originalpublic-meaning originalists to talk in terms of ‘intent.’260
To illustrate the fictionalist approach, consider again the dispute in King.
As described above, the Government claimed that it was “Congress’s intent”
that the phrase “Exchange established by the State,” as used in IRC § 36B, refer
to “both state-run and federally-facilitated Exchanges.”261 How to evaluate this
E.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). As Richard Kay explains, original
intention originalism is not to be confused with originalism about expected application. See
Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 703, 709-10 (2009) (characterizing “original intended meaning” as “the meaning that
textual language had for the relevant enactors when they approved the text in question,” as
contrasted with “the enactors’ expectations with respect to the particular instances that would
come within the scope of the rules created”); see also Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional
Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 797, 806 (1982) (arguing that originalism about expected
application is “implausible precisely because [it] ignore[s] the distinction between the meaning
of a rule (such as a constitutional provision) and the instances of its application”).
255 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 144 (1990) (“The search is not for a subjective intention …. [W]hat counts is what
the public understood.”).
256 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
257 Solum, for example, appears to regard pragmatics as limited to vagueness and ambiguity
resolution. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic and Normative Originalism: Comments on Brian Leiter’s
“Justifying
Originalism,”
LEGAL
THEORY
BLOG,
Oct.
30,
2007,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html.
258 To illustrate, Solum contrasts “conventional” meaning with “special or idiosyncratic”
meaning based upon the “secret” intentions of authors. Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note
252, at 951-52. Only to the extent that Solum has in mind intentions that are “special or
idiosyncratic” given the practical context is that contrast is tenable. See supra notes 40-67 and
accompanying text.
259 Whether the same sorts of arguments against shared intentions in Congress raised in Part II
apply to the Framers goes beyond the scope of this Article. There are, however, obvious
disanalogies between the two settings (e.g., it is far more plausible that the Framers paid careful
attention to constitutional text, see supra note 158).
260 Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert, for example, use the phrase “objective social meaning.”
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 251, at 8. This general reluctance to talk of ‘intent’ suggests that
at least some original-public-meaning originalists regard intent as a dispensable metaphor. Cf.
supra note 1.
261 See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
254
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claim? If fictionalism is correct, this claim is apt if and only if one would
attribute to a generic author an intention refer to “both state-run and federallyfacilitated Exchanges” on the basis of her having written the phrase “Exchanges
established by the State” in the context of enactment. So understood, whether
the Government’s claim is apt plausibly depends on what counts as the “context
of enactment.”
If context is limited to the operative and immediately surrounding
statutory provisions, the Government’s claim appears somewhat implausible:
More fully, § 36B refers to “Exchange[s] established by the State under section
1311 of the [ACA].”262 Section 1311, in turn, encourages but does not require a
state to “establish” an exchange.263 Section 1312 creates a backstop, directing
the federal government, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
to “establish and operate such Exchange within [a] State” if that state opts not
to establish an exchange under § 1311.264 Considering this explicit contrast
between state and federal exchanges, one would likely take the author of § 36B
to mean state by “state.”
If, by contrast, context includes the ACA in its entirety, the
Government’s position becomes much more plausible. For one, the narrow
reading of § 36B would give rise to various anomalies throughout the Act.
Among other things, the Act would thus require the creation of federally
facilitated Exchanges on which there would be no “qualified individuals” eligible
to shop,265 as well as the reporting of information for a “[r]econciliation” of tax
credits that could never occur.266
The Government’s position becomes even more plausible if context is
expanded further still include public discussion of the Act and its structure as a
“three-legged stool”267: Again and again in 2008, the proposed healthcare reform
was characterized as having three basic elements:
First, people will be required to buy insurance, to spread costs
among the sick and the healthy. Second, insurers will be
prohibited from cherry-picking only the healthiest customers,
26 U.S.C. § 36B.
42 U.S.C. § 18031.
264 Id. § 18032.
265 Id. at 10 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)(2)(A), 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012)).
266 Id. at 13–14 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3)).
267 Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially Repealing the
Affordable
Care
Act,
CENTER
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Aug.
5,
2010),
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf.
262
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again to spread costs. Finally, the government will give subsidies
to people, like McDonald’s workers, who can’t afford insurance
on their own.268
Again and again it was emphasized that all three “legs” were necessary for the
stool to stand. Against this backdrop, one would likely attribute to the author
of § 36B the intention to refer to both state and federal exchanges. One would,
in turn, understand her use of the phrase “Exchange established by the State”
as a simple misstatement, i.e. a scrivener’s error.269 This Part discusses below
how to determine of what information context consists. As preview, the
broader understanding of context is probably appropriate in this case.
This Article need take no position as to whether fictionalism about
legislative intent is hermeneutic or revolutionary.270 At least some jurists are
plausibly fictionalists.271 Others, however, are plainly not.272 What matters for
present purposes is that fictionalism is the best way to rationalize discourse
about legislative intent. Whether some jurists are already fictionalists is a
secondary concern.

David Leonhardt, Health Care’s Uneven Road to a New Era, N.Y. TIMES (October 5, 2010),
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/economy/06leonhardt.html.
269 Doerfler, supra note 27; Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 203. As both of the cited articles
suggest, so long as “context” includes the text of the ACA as a whole, the scrivener’s-error reading
is probably—though not certainly—the best one.
270 In other words, this Article need take no position as to whether fictionalism about legislative
intent an error theory. Cf. JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977)
(defending an error theory about moral discourse). The only ‘error’ to which this Article is
committed is that of members of Congress to the extent that members regard their individual
intentions as attributable to Congress as such. But see supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
(considering possibility that members share an intention that statutes be read as if written by a
generic author).
271 See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Congress is
a ‘they’ and not an ‘it’; a committee lacks a brain (or, rather, has so many brains with so many
different objectives that it is almost facetious to impute a joint goal or purpose to the
collectivity). Legislation is an objective text approved in constitutionally prescribed ways; its
scope is not limited by the cerebrations of those who voted for or signed it into law.” (citation
omitted)); Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11 at 17.
272 See Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2002) (Katzmann, J.) (“If
the meaning of the statute is ambiguous, the court may resort to canons of statutory
interpretation to help resolve the ambiguity. The court may also look at legislative history to
determine the intent of Congress.” (citations omitted)).
268
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C. Context of Enactment and Legislative Process
Context is the “mutually salient information” that an author exploits to
make evident to her audience what she means.273 Put another way, context is
the information of which an author can reasonably expect her audience to be
aware. Thus, to determine the context of enactment for some statute, one must
determine that statute’s audience. For a given statute, the audience is, of course,
diverse.274 Because, however, context consists of mutually salient information,
i.e. information salient to all, one can start by identifying the least informed
segment of the audience. Where a statute operates on citizens, for example, the
context of enactment is limited to information of which citizens should be
aware.275 So much is required for a statute to have an accessible meaning that is
constant across that statute’s audience.276
Conversely, because context is cognitive “common ground,”277 there is
no reason to privilege the epistemic position of an author over that of her
audience. Suppose, for example, that certain information (e.g., a wedding
Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 13, at 19.
See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1127 (2011) (“[S]tatutes are directed to
multiple audiences, including courts and agencies.”); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 576 (1985) (observing that, in addition to the
administering agency, “most regulatory statutes’ audiences also include private parties whose
conduct or status is subject to regulation by the administering agency”).
275 By contrast, where a statute operates only upon sophisticated parties, the information
plausibly included in the context of enactment is much greater. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 384 (1990) (“Highly technical
statutes should not be read with the ‘common sense’ of the average person, but rather with the
‘common sense’ of the special audience to which the statute is addressed (such as gas and oil
companies or tax lawyers).”); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). (exploring the “idea that a distinction
can be drawn in the law between rules addressed to the general public and rules addressed to
officials”). Where, for example, a statute operates specifically upon financial institutions, an
author can reasonably expect awareness of technical concepts in a way that she could not with
respect to a general conduct statute. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting a “banking
entity” from engaging in “proprietary trading”). Regulation of sophisticated parties in particular
is thus one means by which Congress can regulate subject matter that an ordinary citizen could
not be reasonably expected to understand.
276 The legislative context thus contrasts with conversational contexts in which a speaker intends
to communicate different things to different audience members. Suppose, for example, that A
and B are planning a surprise birthday party for C. In that context, A might say to B, “I am
looking forward to a quiet night in,” intending to communicate to B that the party is still on but
to C that she is looking forward to a calm evening. For a partial dissent, see Dan-Cohen, supra
note 275 (arguing that the same law can function both as a “conduct” rule directed at citizens
and as a “decision” rule directed at officials).
277 Stalnaker, Indicative Conditionals, supra note 16, at 67.
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anniversary) is of much higher salience to an author (e.g., a law professor) than
to her audience (e.g., her students). Here, it would be unreasonable for that
author to try to exploit that information to make her intentions known (e.g., a
take-home exam prompt indicating that the exam is due on “the special day” at
5 PM). Since her audience would predictably fail to call that information to
mind, such an attempt by the author would predictably fail in turn.
Despite the above, much prior scholarship privileges the epistemic
position of members of Congress when considering what information context
of enactment includes. What results is the eavesdropping model of interpretation.
On this model, legislation is treated as having been written by legislators for
legislators. An interpreter is thus relegated to eavesdropper, listening in on a
conversation between legislators.278 So situated, an interpreter is to read
legislation taking into account information that is salient to legislators. Scholars,
in turn, debate whether sources such as legislative history contain such
information.279
Adherence to the eavesdropping model is plainest in scholarship that
urges greater attention to the legislative process. Judge Katzmann, for example,
argues that an interpreter should pay special attention to those materials, such
as committee reports, that “legislators” and “their staffs” use to “become
educated about [a] bill.”280 Likewise, Gluck and Bressman recommend
consideration of different kinds of legislative history (e.g., committee reports,
floor statements) as well as other non-textual sources (e.g., CBO scores) and
structural cues (e.g., type of legislative vehicle) in proportion to the significance
those indicators have to drafters.281 Even those who oppose consideration of
extra-textual sources such as legislative history, however, tend to accept the basic
eavesdropping frame. Even Justice Scalia, for instance, has characterized the

See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, RATIO JURIS 423, 434 (2008) (“Judges
and litigants are not parties to the legislative conversation, so to speak, and they have to rely on
secondary sources to gather the relevant information.”).
279 See, e.g., Nelson, What Is Textualism?, supra note 17, at 363 (“Justice Scalia suggests not that the
legislature’s actual collective intent is always nonexistent or irrelevant, but rather that judicial
decisions will better approximate that intent if courts generally disregard legislative history than
if they take it into account.”).
280 KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 19.
281 See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 989 (“[T]he real question about legislative
history is not whether it should be consulted but, rather, how to separate the useful from the
misleading.”); Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 782 (recommending that courts
“constru[e] legislation consistently with the [corresponding] CBO score” because of the
“centrality of the CBO score” to drafters).
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role of an interpreter as “read[ing] the words of [a] text as any ordinary Member of
Congress would have read them, and apply[ing] the meaning so determined.” 282
As an alternative, this Article puts forward the conversation model of
interpretation. On this model, legislation is treated as having been written by
legislators for those who administer the law (e.g., courts, agencies) and for those
on whom the law operates (e.g., citizens). An interpreter, in turn, occupies the
position of conversational participant, listening to statements directed at her and
the other participants. From this position, an interpreter considers legislative
text in light of information salient to legislators and, for example, citizens alike.
Again, this approach involves attentiveness to the least informed segment of the
group. To the extent that information has little or no salience to this segment,
an interpreter will place little or no weight on that information when determining
what an author means.
The conversation model of interpretation does not by itself dictate
which sources of information an interpreter should consider in a particular case.
Again, context consists of the information of which both speaker and audience
should be aware. And, for example, how large a set of informational sources to
which citizens should be attentive in a particular case is a question the model
leaves open. By deemphasizing the epistemic position of legislators, the model
does, however, alter the set of plausible answers to such questions. Go back to
legislative history. As discussed below, different considerations speak for and
against holding an audience accountable for non-textual, historical informational
sources such as legislative history in different cases. That said, hard to imagine
is a case in which it would be reasonable to hold an audience accountable for
legislative history to the exclusion of other non-textual sources (e.g., newspaper
articles, television reports, etc.). Especially so if the case involves a law that
operates upon citizens. With the ACA, for example, can one seriously argue
that, say, the Senate Finance Committee Report is of higher mutual salience than
cotemporaneous front-page reporting from The New York Times or The Wall Street
Journal? Or contemporaneous evening news reports featuring officials and
experts discussing the proposed law? In short, legislative history is, on the
conversation model, just one non-textual, historical source among many.
Even less plausible is the suggestion that an interpreter should sort
carefully among different kinds of legislative history. Gluck and Bressman, for
example, urge courts “to separate the useful from the misleading,” reasoning
that attention to the legislative process reveals some kinds of legislative history
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
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as more “reliable” than others.283 Gluck and Bressman base their comparative
reliability assessments on the views of congressional staffers. Given this
evidence, it is entirely plausible that, say, committee reports are of much higher
salience than floor statements to staffers.284 Conceivably the same is true of
agencies, given their “multilevel and ongoing relationship with Congress.”285 And
perhaps the same is (somewhat) true of courts, given their (uneven) history of
privileging committee reports over other legislative historical sources.286 Add
ordinary citizens to the conversational mix, however, and any difference in
mutual salience quickly becomes de minimis. If judicial understanding of the
legislative process is lacking,287 popular understanding is woeful at best. More
still, as explained in Part II, committee reports and the like have no claim to
authority. 288 As such, it is hard to see how citizens have an obligation to be
privy to such distinctions.289
Privileging the epistemic position of members of Congress can suggest
textual clarity where there is none. In Zuber v. Allen,290 for example, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Department of Agriculture order requiring milk distributors
within the Boston marketing area to pay premium prices to “nearby” milk
producers.291 The Court held that this “nearby” differential was inconsistent
with a federal statute requiring that orders regulating the handling of milk
provide for uniform prices to all producers within a given marketing area,
subject to specific exceptions.292 The Court rejected the Government’s
argument that the “nearby” differential fit within the exception for “market ...
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 977.
See id.
285 Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U.
L. REV. 871, 884 (2015) (observing that this relationship allows agencies “firsthand knowledge
of the critical debates and the character of their resolution,” making them “more reliable readers
of legislative history”); see also Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 22, at 676 (noting that
“drafters saw their primary interpretive relationship as one with agencies”).
286 See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying legislative history we have
repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the
Committee Reports on the bill ….”); but see infra notes 290-299 and accompanying text.
287 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
288 Nourse, for example, argues that, owed to ignorance of the legislative process, interpreters
routinely confuse the legislative history equivalents of “majority” and “dissenting opinions.”
Nourse, supra note 1, at 73. As explained in Part II, however, Nourse is wrong to regard these
alleged “majority opinions” (e.g., statements by a bill’s primary sponsors) as “authoritative
statements of meaning.” Id.
289 Any hierarchy of legislative history thus contrasts with, for example, statutory text or prior
judicial decisions, both of which are formally binding on citizens and so more plausibly generate
a duty of inquiry.
290 396 U.S. 168 (1969).
291 Id. at 170-71.
292 Id.
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differentials customarily applied” by distributors, holding that “permissible
adjustments are limited to compensation for rendering an economic service,”
characterizing the “nearby” differential as a conferral of “monopoly profits.”293
The Court based its interpretation on the accompanying House Report, which
“suggest[ed] that ‘market differentials,’ as well as all the other differentials,
contemplated particular understood economic adjustments.”294 In dissent,
Justice Black contended that the broader legislative history, in particular a
colloquy on the Senate floor, “ma[de] it clear beyond any doubt that this
provision was designed to allow the Secretary broad leeway in regulating the
milk industry.”295 This included leeway to preserve price advantages enjoyed by
farmers near Boston prior to federal regulation.296 The majority insisted that its
“conclusions [were] in no way undermined by the colloquy on the floor,”
reasoning that, whereas “[a] committee report represents the considered and
collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation,” “[f]loor debates reflect at best the understanding
of individual Congressmen.”297
What the exchange between the majority and dissent in Zuber suggests
is that the statute was simply “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue” before the Court.298 Read in isolation, the language at issue admits of a
Id. at 181, 188.
Id. at 181.
295 Id. at 202-03 (Black, J., dissenting).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 186; but see Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 17, at 986 (finding that drafters regard
“‘staged’ colloquies between the chair and ranking member of the committee as reliably
indicating the common understanding on both sides”).
298 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, (1984). While
Zuber is a pre-Chevron case, courts continue to consult legislative history when determining
whether an agency interpretation is “reasonable,” and therefore authoritative under Chevron. See
id. at 843 (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”). While courts disagree as
to whether it is appropriate to consult legislative history at Step One or Step Two of the Chevron
analysis, compare Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that “the lower
court erred by failing to ‘exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construction,’” including
consultation of legislative history, at Chevron Step One (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) with Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498
F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (“This court has generally been reluctant to employ legislative
history at step one of Chevron analysis, mindful that the ‘interpretive clues’ to be found in such
history will rarely speak with sufficient clarity to permit us to conclude ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’ that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” (quoting Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586, 590 (2004)) (citation omitted)), that
distinction is likely irrelevant. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has
Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 602 (2009) (“[N]othing of consequence turns on whether the
set of permissible interpretations has one element or more than one element; the only question
is whether the agency’s interpretation is in that set or not.”). Courts likewise continue to
293
294
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broad or narrow reading. The same is true after taking into account information
contained in available non-textual historical sources. The majority created an
illusion of clarity by distinguishing “good” legislative history from “bad.” The
reality, however, is that the text read against the backdrop of conflicting
legislative history is unclear as to whether “market … differentials” includes
differentials that are “economically [un]sound.”299
To be clear, one could have reason to pay special attention to committee
reports and the like if Congress as such formed intentions. Where an author’s
intentions are unclear after taking into account in all mutually salient
information, clarity will sometimes result from considering additional
information salient to the author. Suppose, for example, that a diplomat were
to write an unclear note to her aide (e.g., “Bring me the package.”), only to be
taken hostage days later. Here, the aide might try to resolve the unclarity (e.g.,
“What package?”) by considering sources of information she ordinarily would
not (e.g., the diplomat’s private email). Because considering such sources is nonstandard (and, hence, the information contained therein was not mutually salient
at the time the note was written), it would have been unreasonable for the
diplomat to expect her aide to do so. Still, to the extent that the diplomat’s
message was unintentionally unclear, the aide might gain insight by considering
those sources all the same. The same would be true with respect to unclear
statutes if Congress as such formed intentions. But it does not. As such, there
are no unexpressed intentions to discover in Congress’ personal effects.
Because it places members of Congress on equal epistemic footing with
other participants in the legislative conversation, fictionalism differs from the
otherwise similar “deferentialist” approach to statutory interpretation advocated
by Scott Soames. According to Soames, the “content of the law” as “what the
lawmakers meant and what any reasonable person who understood the linguistic
meanings of their words, the publically available facts, the recent history in the
lawmaking context, and the background of existing law into which the new
provision is expected to fit, would take them to have meant.”300 As Soames
explains:
privilege some kinds of legislative history over others, both in the administrative law context
and elsewhere. See, e.g., Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D.Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir.)
(“Floor statements are not given the same weight as some other types of legislative history, such
as committee reports, because they generally represent only the view of the speaker and not
necessarily that of the entire body. However, floor statements by the sponsors of the legislation
are given considerably more weight than floor statements by other members, and they are given
even more weight where, as here, other legislators did not offer any contrary views.” (citation
omitted)).
299 Zuber, 396 U.S. at 210 (Black, J., dissenting).
300 Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 15 at 598 (emphasis added).
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In general, what a speaker uses a sentence S to assert in a given
context is, to a fair approximation, what a reasonable hearer or
reader who knows the linguistic meaning of S, and is aware of
all relevant intersubjectively available features of the context of
the utterance, would rationally take the speaker’s use of S to be
intended to convey and commit the speaker to.301
In a circumstance where a speaker’s communicative intention is unclear,
however, what a speaker “meant” diverges from “what any reasonable person
… would take them to have meant.” And, because Soames is a realist about
legislative intent,302 his account is thus consistent with, and, as a descriptive
matter, appears to call for, special attention to committee report and the like
where a statute is unclear.303
In addition to legislative history, the conversation model also calls into
question whether it makes sense for courts to pay special attention to customary
legal usage. In Morissette v. United States,304 for example, Justice Jackson famously
remarked:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas
that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.305
In the above-quoted passage, Justice Jackson appears to understand legislation
as communication between members of Congress and courts, which is to say
communication between lawyers.306 If the statute at issue had been, say, the

Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 599-600 (“[T]here is thus no real alternative in [Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223
(1993)] identifying the legal content with what Congress actually asserted (as opposed to what it could
have asserted using the same words had the arguments, debates, and legislative history been
different).”)
303 See Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 231, 239-40
(2011) (lamenting Justice Scalia’s “conclu[sion] that inquiries into legislative history to discover
the intent of the lawmakers are irrelevant”).
304 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
305 Id. at 263.
306 See Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 12, at 2464 (discussing Morissette, observing that
“[f]or statutes, the lawyer's lexicon, of course, has particular relevance”)
301
302
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Judiciary Act of 1789,307 Justice Jackson’s approach might have made sense. In
Morissette, however, the statute at issue was a general conduct statute, specifically
a criminal statute prohibiting the “embezzle[ment], steal[ing], purloin[ing], or
knowing[] conver[sion]” government property.308 The question before the
Court was whether that statute prohibited only “embezzle[ment],” “steal[ing],”
or “purloin[ing]” accompanied by criminal intent. The Government argued
that no, contending that the express prohibition of “knowing[]” conversion
implied the absence of an intent requirement for the other offenses. 309
Unconvinced, the Court reasoned that, at common law, intent was “inherent in
the idea” of larceny and other such crimes, whereas certain “unwitting acts”
constituted conversion.310 Thus, on the assumption that Congress intended to
retain common-law usages, an express intent requirement would have been
superfluous for the non-conversion offenses.
The decision in Morissette was plausibly correct, on rule-of-lenity311
grounds.312 Justice Jackson’s general principle, that statutes should be read
1 Stat. 73.
Morissette, 246 U.S. at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641).
309 See id. at 249-50.
310 Id.at 252-53.
311 In general, whether “substantive” canons of interpretation (e.g., the modern canon of
constitutional avoidance, the federalism canon, etc.) are compatible with the conversation model
is an open question. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW
TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION __ (2016) (discussing these and other substantive
canons). To the extent that such canons are best understood as approximations of Congress’s
intent, those canons likely reflect the sort of undue attention to the epistemic position of
members of Congress criticized above (e.g., a special concern with maintaining the “usual
constitutional balance of federal and state powers,” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460
(1991), is probably not shared by most citizens). On the other hand, if such canons are best
understood as something like judge-made law, see William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law
of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017), then it is plausible that those canons
are on par with other prior judicial decisions in terms of mutual salience. See supra note __.
The latter possibility assumes, of course, that judges have the authority to make interpretive law.
Regardless, the rule of lenity demands less justification than other substantive canons. The
reason is that the rule of lenity acts as something like a doctrinal mechanism for enforcing the
mutual-salience requirement imposed by the conversation model—or at least a greatly relaxed
analogue. By prohibiting the enforcement of an uncertain interpretation against a criminal
defendant, the rule of lenity, in effect, bars courts from giving legal effect to a reading of a
criminal statute that is, from the epistemic perspective of the defendant, unduly esoteric. See,
e.g., U.S. v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2008) (“When interpreting a criminal statute, we do
not play the part of a mind reader.”); but see U.S. v. Muscarello, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (“The
rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, . . . we can
make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” (quoting United States v. Wells, 519
U. S. 482, 499 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).
312 See, e.g., WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, THIRD EDITION 940 (1916) (defining “steal”
as “to take without right and with intent to keep wrongfully” (emphasis added)).
307
308
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through the eyes of a lawyer, however, seems questionable as applied to statutes
the audience of which includes ordinary citizens presumably—and
reasonably—not well-versed in Blackstone.313
The question remains what sources to consider in a particular case.
Because context is information of which speaker and audience should be aware,
that question is irreducibly normative.314 The normative character of the
question is especially apparent where, as here, awareness is largely
constructive.315 In general, norms of statutory interpretation should promote at
least two core values.316 The first is democracy: norms should make it feasible for
a legislator to comprehend a bill at the time she casts her vote. The second is
fair notice: norms should make it feasible for an individual on whom a statute
operates to comprehend that statute once it is in effect. So understood,
democracy and fair notice work in tandem to facilitate communication between
legislator and citizen. Democracy ensures that a legislator understands what she
is saying. Fair notice ensures that a citizen understands what was said. Put
another way, a commitment to the above values flows just from a commitment
to legislation as an effective means of communication.317 As Jeremey Waldon
explains, when attempting to communicate by statute, a legislator must assume
that her words mean the same thing to her as to citizens.318 Together, democracy
and fair notice help make it possible for that assumption to be a reasonable one.
Prior scholarship assumes both of these values, though often without
explicit discussion. Textualists, for example, stress, on the one hand, the

Important here is that the statute at issue in Morissette was enacted in 1948. 62 Stat. 725.
See Fallon, Three Symmetries, supra note 85, at 694 (“If both textualists and purposivists need
to specify the breadth of the context within which statutes should be interpreted, and if the
judgments as to appropriate breadth will sometimes determine the outcome of cases, then issues
bearing on the specification of semantic and policy contexts assume vital importance.”).
315 See Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 105-06
(2003) (“The people who are subject to the law—the citizens—are almost certain never to read
it. Average citizens do not peruse statute books even once in their lifetimes; most will never
read even one full paragraph from a court opinion.”).
316 See Nelson, What Is Textualism?, supra note 17, at 353 (“Textualists and intentionalists alike
give every indication of caring both about the meaning intended by the enacting legislature and
about the need for readers to have fair notice of that meaning ….”). See also Manning, Inside
Congress’s Mind, supra note 28, at 1947 (arguing that the “construct” of legislative intent
“necessarily depend[s] on normative” premises).
317 More specifically, that legislation is an effective means of communication between legislator
and citizen (as opposed to, e.g., other legislators, legal elites, etc.). As explained above, so much
is required by basic notions of fairness and rule of law. See supra note 208-214 and accompanying
text.
318 WALDRON, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 129.
313
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preservation of legislative “bargains,”319 and, on the other, the public
accessibility of the law.320 What this shows is a commitment by textualists to
both legislator (when she casts her vote) and citizen (post-enactment) being able
to know “what the law is”321 when it matters. And this, in turn, shows a
commitment to effective communication between legislator and citizen.
Purposivists, perhaps unsurprisingly, given their friendliness to legislative
history, place more emphasis on legislator understanding.322 Still, even
purposivists accept that, for example, courts should consider only publicly
available materials when making sense of a statute.323 This concession shows
that, in addition to legislator understanding, purposivists are to at least some
extent committed to citizen understanding as well.
With respect to informational sources, both democracy and fair notice
support, other things equal, norms that minimize the epistemic burden for
involved parties. By minimizing epistemic burden, such norms increase
feasibility of comprehension at all stages (e.g., enactment, compliance,
enforcement, adjudication) for all interpreters (e.g., members of Congress,
citizens, agencies, courts). To illustrate, take a highly restrictive source norm
according to which one is to refrain completely from considering non-textual,
historical sources when interpreting a statute. Pursuant to this norm, one would
interpret a legislative text with an eye to obvious conventions (e.g., that Congress
writes statutes in English) and to other formally binding instruments (e.g., statutes,
regulations, judicial decisions).324 In turn, one would attribute to Congress
See, e.g., Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 11, at 441 (“[Textualists] believe that smoothing
over the rough edges in a statute threatens to upset whatever complicated bargaining led to its
being cast in the terms that it was.”); Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 541 (“In the case of interest
group legislation it is most likely that the extent of the bargain … is exhausted by the subjects
of the express compromises reflected in the statute. The legislature ordinarily would rebuff any
suggestion that judges be authorized to fill in blanks in the ‘spirit’ of the compromise.”).
320 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179
(1989) (“Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of
knowing what it prescribes.”).
321 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
322 See Nelson, What Is Textualism?, supra note 17, at 351-52 (observing that purposivists
“emphasiz[e] that statutes are mechanisms to convey the policy decisions of the people whom
we have elected to legislate for us,” and courts should “try to enforce the directives that members
of the enacting legislature understood themselves to be adopting”); see also, e.g., McNollgast,
Positive Canons, supra note 99, at 716 (emphasizing that “legislators do not want judicial
interpretation of statutes to introduce randomness and unpredictability into policy outcomes”).
323 See Nelson, What Is Textualism?, supra note 17, at 359 (observing that purposivists are “happy
to treat committee reports and other publicly available materials as part of the context” but
“reject other information that is probative of lawmakers’ actual intentions but not spread out
on the public record”).
324 The reason for including other formally binding instruments is that their bindingness
presumably generates a notice duty in just the same way as does the statutory text itself.
319
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whatever intentions one would attribute to a generic author on the basis of her
having written that text, given this limited additional contextual information.
With this norm in place, the epistemic burden on an interpreter would be
minimal at each stage. The non-obvious information one would have to
consider—the text of other formally binding instruments—would be of
reasonably limited quantity, easy to access,325 and clearly designated.
What speaks against such a norm? As applied to existing legislation, one
concern is that such a norm might conflict with legislator understanding at the
time of enactment. Suppose that some legislator were to base her understanding
of some statute, either directly or indirectly, on the assumption that the statute
would be read with an eye to various non-textual, historical sources. Here,
application of a highly restrictive source norm might render that legislator’s
understanding incorrect. In turn, application of that norm might hinder
democracy if that legislator’s understanding is representative. This sort of
mismatch is, as Jarrod Shobe has argued, more likely with older statutes.326 As
Shobe explains, “Congress’s drafting process has become increasingly
sophisticated over the last forty years,” with various reforms “allow[ing]
professional drafters to be involved in virtually every legislative project.”327 The
result is increased attention to textual “clarity,”328 which is just to say decreased
reliance on non-textual, historical sources. But even with contemporary statutes,
mismatch is possible. Increased “unorthodox lawmaking,”329 i.e. lawmaking
outside the traditional committee structure, undermines, to some extent, efforts
at clarity.330 Further, use of “professional drafters,” i.e. legislative counsel,
remains entirely optional.331
The above suggests that application of a highly restrictive source norm
to existing legislation would result in a sort of democracy gap, however minimal.
For that reason, a less restrictive norm is probably appropriate with respect to
such legislation. Application of a less restrictive norm would increase the
epistemic burden on all participants, citizens in particular. For that reason,
application of such a norm would impair fair notice to some degree. Under

Assuming internet access.
See Shobe, supra note 159, at 856-60.
327 Id. at 812.
328 Id. at 831. But see Doerfler, supra note 27, at 815 (arguing that the size and complexity of
contemporary statutes hinders efforts at textual precision); Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note
203, at 97-103 (similar).
329 BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed., 1997).
330 See Shobe, supra note 159, at 859.
331 Id. at 821-22.
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current conditions, however, some tradeoff between fair notice and democracy
is unavoidable.
By contrast, as applied to future legislation, a highly restrictive source
norm would be appropriate if accompanied by reforms to the legislative process.
If, for example, Congress were to mandate participation of legislative counsel at
each stage of the drafting process, any democracy gap would close, at least in
large part. Absent such a gap, it is unclear what would speak against such an
epistemic-burden minimizing norm.
To be clear, the above discussion leaves open the possibility that values
other than democracy and fair notice (e.g., judicial administrability) might
inform the determination of what source(s) of information an interpreter ought
to consider. The claim here is just that those two values are of paramount
importance insofar as legislation is understood best as a means of
communication. To promote democracy and fair notice in this context is, in
effect, to reduce the burden on speaker and listener, respectively, and thereby to
facilitate efficient communication between them.
CONCLUSION
Legislative intent is a necessary fiction. One can make sense of federal
statutes only if one attributes to Congress various intentions, both
communicative and practical. As an empirical matter, however, Congress qua
“it” intends very little. The solution this Article proposes is to understand intent
attributions not as aiming at the literal truth but rather as involving a pretense.
The pretense this Article offers is that federal statutes have some author or
other. Taken to involve this pretense, an attribution of intent is apt if and only
if one would make it about the author of a statute as such.
Because legislative intent is a fiction, the ‘author’ of legislation, i.e.
Congress as such, ‘intends’ what it appears to intend and no more. Oftentimes
this will mean that federal statutes are less clear than one might have hoped. If
Congress had ‘hidden’ intentions, statutes that appear uncertain might become
certain upon further investigation. And if statutes were uncertain less often,
interpreting courts and agencies would have fewer policy decisions to make
when resolving concrete disputes. The draw of positive-political-science
accounts of legislative intent comes in no small part from the promise that, with
enough data and methodological savvy, one could, when confronted with hard
policy questions, identify answers laid down by Congress in advance. What this
Article suggests, however, is that that promise is false. Quite often, text gives
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out, leaving a policy decision. Attention to the nuances of legislative process
does nothing to change this.
Whether one should fill the remaining statutory “gaps”332 by, for
example, applying “legal rules of interpretation”333 or by deferring to executive
branch officials334 goes beyond the scope of this Article.335 What this Article
shows is just that that question is more important than it would be if sifting
through obscure legislative materials could provide meaningful guidance to a
faithful-agent court.
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Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, VOLUME 1: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS AND
HOW WE USE IT 403, 419 (2008) [hereinafter Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts] (“This generation
of new content by filling gaps in the original text is another respect in which legal
interpretation is importantly different from some other kinds of linguistic interpretation.”).
333 Baude & Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
334 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (recommending increased deference to administrative
agencies on questions of statutory interpretation).
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219 (1991) (“If meaning has run out, and we are faced with a linguistically hard case, then
nothing about the nature of meaning suggests that we must then ask the ‘What would James
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